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Abstract 
 
Decision-makers often despair at what they regard as fickle and unpredictable public 
attitudes toward environmental risks.  Research has shown, however, that public 
perceptions of risk are not irrational.  Psychologists have developed the so-called 
'psychometric paradigm', which indicates that laypeople approach the meaning of 'risk' using  
a more political framework than that used by experts.  This includes factors such as whether 
or not they have control over their exposure to the risk, whether the effect will be immediate 
or delayed, and whether future generations will be affected.  Sociologists have proposed a 
'cultural theory of risk', which argues that alternative views about risk are inextricably inter-
linked with the ways in which social order is perceived and experienced.  Both these theories 
have been developed and promoted largely within disciplinary boundaries and in isolation 
from each other.  This report argues that both perspectives play important roles in shaping, 
maintaining, and changing views about risks, and that these two components are inter-
related in complex but predictable ways.  Thus, the aim of this research was to advance our 
understanding of risk perceptions by integrating the 'psychometric paradigm' and 'cultural 
theory' approaches. 
 
This paper reports the detailed results from a questionnaire survey (N=201) conducted in 
Norfolk (UK).  Four distinct worldviews were identified, namely: fatalist, or phlegmatic over 
influence on outcomes; individualistic, or a preference for competitive procedures; 
hierarchist, or a belief in order and rules to guide decisions; and egalitarian, or an emphasis 
on fairness through justice.  Each of these worldviews was associated with a specific pattern 
of risk perceptions in a manner which was consistent with cultural theory.  Cultural theory, 
however, was only able to explain 14%, at most, of the variance in risk perceptions, whereas 
the 'psychometric paradigm' explained as much as 50% in some cases.  The authors argue 
that the two methodologies explained importantly different dimensions of risk perceptions, 
and that deeper insights into the underlying rationales are obtained by using the two 
approaches in a complementary manner.  Thus, the combined methodology provided 
insights into underlying social issues of trust and accountability which play an important role 
in shaping risk perceptions.  This research suggests that social and political frameworks 
which influence the way environmental threats are interpreted can be identified and that a 
consistent theory of reactions to risks can be established. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Two distinct theories currently dominate the field of risk perception.  One is the so-called 
'psychometric paradigm', rooted within the disciplines of psychology and decision sciences, 
while the other derives from cultural theory and has been developed by anthropologists and 
sociologists.  Both theories have made important contributions to the understanding of risk 
perceptions, but, until recently, they have been developed and promoted largely within 
disciplinary boundaries and in isolation from each other.  The aim of this research project 
was to advance our understanding of risk perceptions by integrating the 'psychometric 
paradigm' and cultural theory approaches.  In order to do this, we felt that it was necessary 
to develop a new methodology that incorporated both qualitative and quantitative elements. 
This Working Paper reports the detailed quantitative results from a questionnaire survey of 
risk perceptions conducted in Norfolk, UK.  Focus groups were also conducted and the 
qualitative results from these will be published elsewhere. 
 
1.1 The 'psychometric paradigm' 
The 'psychometric paradigm' was developed by Slovic and his colleagues (Fischhoff et al., 
1978 and 1983; Slovic et al., 1980 and 1985).  These researchers showed that 'experts' and 
'laypeople' used different definitions of 'risk' when making their judgements.  'Experts' based 
their risk ratings on the expected number of fatalities.  'Laypeople', in contrast, had a richer 
definition of risk, which incorporated a number of more qualitative characteristics such as 
'voluntariness' (whether people have a choice about being exposed to the risk), 'immediacy 
of effect' (the extent to which the effect is immediate, or might occur at some later time), and 
'catastrophic potential' (whether many people would be killed at once).  Slovic et al. (1985) 
identified and analysed eighteen character-istics of this kind using factor analysis and found 
that they could be resolved into three factors broadly defined as 'dread', 'unknown' and 
'exposure'.  Furthermore, high perceived risk was associated with issues which were rated 
highly on both the 'dread' and the 'unknown' factors (e.g. nuclear power, lasers, herbicides), 
whereas risks which were rated low on these factors (regardless of the expected number of 
fatalities associated with them) were perceived as being of low risk and there was little 
desire for additional regulation in these areas (e.g. motor vehicles, alcoholic beverages, 
downhill skiing). 
 
These findings were significant because they challenged the dominant perception of 
'experts' and policy makers, which was that members of the public were either irrational or 
ignorant (or both) when they showed high concern for issues such as nuclear power while 
seeming to ignore the risks associated with issues such as road accidents, which 'experts' 
rated much more highly.  One implication of this work was that risk management strategies 
which focused solely on trying to 'explain the facts' more effectively to members of the public 
(e.g. making them understand the fatality statistics) were likely to fail to reduce their level of 
concern about technologies, such as nuclear power, which were rated high on both the 
'dread' and 'unknown' dimensions. 
 
One problem with this work is that Slovic et al. (at least initially) sought to identify attributes 
of risk which were shared universally by all individuals, and did not attempt to distinguish 
between individuals or groups of people, except 'experts' versus 'laypeople' (see, for 
example, Slovic et al., 1982).  The statistical analysis in these early studies was based on 
mean scores for whole samples, and therefore provided no information about how 
individuals might differ in their perceptions of risks.  The result of the early 'psychometric 
paradigm' studies was to develop a taxonomy - or 'cognitive map' - of hazards, and the 
implication was that all individuals would assess these objects in the same manner.  This 
approach treated risk, or rather 'risky' technologies, activities and products, as external 
objects with a set of pre-defined qualities and drawbacks.  Later 'psychometric paradigm' 
studies have attempted to investigate differences between individuals, by searching for 
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potential correlations between perceived risk and standard socio-demographic variables 
such as gender, age and occupation; and also nationality or place of residence (reviewed in 
Marris et al., 1996; Rohrmann, 1995; Sjöberg and Drottz-Sjöberg, 1994; Slovic, 1992).  Very 
few of these variables were found to correlate consistently with risk perception.  
Furthermore, even when differences were identified, this approach provided no 
understanding about why different people perceive risks differently.  The influence of factors 
such as gender, age, or nationality apparently relate to some underlying rationale that was 
not clearly revealed in these quantitative cross-sectorial studies. 
 
The 'psychometric paradigm' also led to a focus on the dread-catastrophe aspect of risks, 
but failed to identify potentially interesting social issues such as trust, blame and 
accountability which, we argue, are undoubtedly tied-in with the technologies, products and 
activities found in the 'high dread-high unknown' quadrant of the factor space derived from 
the results of Slovic and his colleagues.  Psychologists have more recently begun to explore 
the role of underlying values in shaping risk perceptions (Peters and Slovic, 1996; Sjöberg, 
1995; Slovic, 1996; Slovic et al., 1995).  Slovic has also turned his attention to factors such 
as stigma, trust and 'affect' (Slovic et al., 1991; Slovic, 1996).  Although these recent 
developments are significant, we felt that a new approach was needed to explore the cultural 
context of risk perceptions, and that cultural theory provided a potentially useful framework 
to investigate how worldviews and other cultural factors influence risk perceptions.  (See 
Marris et al., 1996 for a fuller review and critique of the 'psychometric paradigm' approach to 
risk perceptions). 
 
1.2 Cultural theory of risk 
Cultural theory, in contrast to the 'psychometric paradigm', focuses on the differences 
between people in their reactions to risk.  It argues that risk perceptions reflect the way in 
which society itself is perceived, and that alternative views about risks (and the world we live 
in) flow from patterns of social order.  Cultural theorists have argued that the psychological 
approach, by focusing solely on abstract ratings of risks, has failed to focus on the important 
issues at stake in judgements about risks.  More interesting questions would include: who is 
trusted to manage risk? who gets blamed in the case of mishap? what constitutes fairness, 
consent, or accountability? (Douglas, 1986). 
 
Cultural theory was originally proposed by Douglas (Douglas, 1982; Douglas and Wildavsky, 
1982), and has since been taken up and developed by others (Schwarz and Thompson, 
1990; Thompson et al., 1990; Rayner, 1992).  Cultural theory consists of two components.  
The first is a theoretical approach based on the belief that adherence to a certain pattern of 
social relationships generates a distinctive way of looking at the world, and vice versa: that 
adherence to a certain worldview legitimises a corresponding type of social relations.  The 
second component of cultural theory is a taxonomy of viable combinations of cultural bias 
and social organisation, based on two dimensions (grid and group).  Thompson et al. 
interpreted these variables as follows: "Group refers to the extent to which an individual is 
incorporated into bounded units.  The greater the incorporation, the more individual choice is 
subject to group determination.  Grid denotes the degree to which an individual's life is 
circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions.  The more binding and extensive the 
scope of the prescriptions, the less of life that is open to individual negotiation."  (Thompson 
et al., 1990, p. 5).  According to cultural theory, these are independent variables which can 
be represented as a pair of orthogonal axes.  In each of the four quadrants resulting from 
this representation, a different archetype is situated.  The four cultures are defined by the 
strength of their grid and group characteristics and have been labelled hierarchy, 
egalitarianism, individualism, and fatalism (see Figure 1.1). 
 
Hierarchists are characterised by strong group boundaries and binding prescriptions (high 
grid-high group).  An individual's position in the world is defined by a set of institutionalised 
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classifications, based, for example, on age, gender, or race.  Such demarcations are 
deemed to be unquestionable, and are justified on the grounds that they enable people to 
live more harmoniously together.  Egalitarians are also high-group, but, in contrast to 
hierarchists, their lives are not prescribed by role differentiation.  Instead, individuals are 
expected to negotiate their relationship with others and no one person is granted authority 
by virtue of their position.  Individualists are low in both the group and the grid dimensions.  
Such individuals are bound by neither group incorporation nor prescribed roles.  In such a 
social context, all boundaries are subject to negotiation.  Fatalists are low group but high 
grid.  Like hierarchists, their autonomy is restricted by social distinctions.  In contrast to 
hierarchists, however, they are excluded from membership in the institutions responsible for 
making up the rules, and tend to see themselves as 'outsiders' (Douglas, 1982; Douglas and 
Wildavsky, 1982; Jenkins-Smith, 1994; Thompson et al., 1990). 
 
These four types of social relations give rise to four distinct cultural biases.  Thus, according 
to cultural theory, hierarchists are predisposed to trust large centralised, hierarchical, 
institutions.  In relation to risks, they will tend to trust those in authority (e.g. governmental 
regulatory authorities) and will show little concern for technologies which are sanctioned and 
managed by experts, but will be chiefly worried about threats to the social order (e.g. crime).  
Egalitarians, in contrast, will tend to be suspicious of anybody in a position of authority, 
including specialised experts.  Concentration of power, especially in institutions which are 
seen to be centralised, secretive and not accountable for their actions violates their 
fundamental principle of equality.  Environmental threats which are seen to emanate from 
such institutions (e.g. nuclear authorities or large private companies) are given most 
prominence, together with global catastrophes with irreversible consequences, especially if 
they are seen to be inequitable.  For individualists, it is intrusions upon their ability to bid and 
bargain with others which are singled out as the most important threats.  Examples might 
include governmental regulation of private business or the imposition of 'politically 
correctness'.  Fatalists, as the name implies, feel powerless in the face of change, which is 
always perceived as being imposed from the outside.  The world might produce a 
cornucopia of wealth, health, and safety, but it might just as readily produce disaster.  The 
occurrence and outcome of events are thought to be subject to fate and chance (Douglas, 
1982; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Jenkins-Smith, 1994; Thompson et al., 1990). 
 
The four types of social relations are also hypothesised to lead to preferences about 
decision making procedures about all issues, including risk management (Rayner, 1984).  
Hierarchists will choose to base management strategies on expert committees and universal 
safety standards.  Egalitarians will favour decision making processes which encourage 
public participation.  Individualists will promote economic factors, and in particular cost-
benefit analysis as the proper basis for rational decision-making.  Fatalists feel that 
decisions are beyond their control and will feel obliged to accept whatever is imposed upon 
them.  Thompson also proposed that four different 'myths of Nature' could be characterised 
according to grid and group dimensions (Thompson et al., 1990).  For the hierarchist, Nature 
is 'perverse/tolerant': forgiving to most events but vulnerable to an occasional disaster.  For 
the egalitarian, Nature is 'ephemeral' and the slightest interference could cause an 
environmental disaster.  For the individualist, Nature is 'benign': it is wonderfully forgiving 
and will return to its natural equilibrium whatever mankind does to it.  For the fatalist, Nature 
is 'capricious' and random.  Thompson states that "These myths of Nature are the simplest 
models of ecosystem stability that when matched to the different ways in which the 
managing institutions behave, render those institutions rational." (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 
26).  Thus, hierarchists must regulate against extreme occurrences, egalitarians must treat 
the ecosystem with great care, individualists will have a laissez-faire attitude, and fatalists 
will just cope with erratic events. 
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We believe that social and institutional constraints undoubtedly influence the behaviour and 
beliefs of individuals, but the two-by-two framework of grid-group taxonomy which underpins 
cultural theory may not be sufficient to explain all the relevant cultural factors.  Furthermore, 
even this relatively simple framework has proved difficult to operationalise. 
 
1.3 Quantitative tests of cultural theory 
Studies using qualitative methods such as participant observation and focus groups have 
provided empirical support for cultural theory (e.g. Rayner, 1986; Rayner and Cantor, 1987), 
but recent efforts to test the theory quantitatively have been more problematic (Dake, 1991 
and 1992; Wildavsky and Dake, 1990, Dake and Wildavsky, 1991).  Dake devised a set of 
statements about society and postulated that responses to these statements would provide 
a measure the four cultural biases, i.e. hierarchy, individualism, fatalism or egalitarianism.  
Respondents were asked to rate the risks associated with a number of different activities 
and technologies, and the authors investigated correlations between worldviews, as defined 
by responses to the cultural bias statements, and the risk ratings given to the different 
issues.  The pattern of correlations reported by Dake broadly followed that predicted by 
cultural theory.  Thus, egalitarianism was correlated with high scores for technological and 
environmental risks; hierarchy was correlated with high scores for risks associated with 
social deviance; and individualism was correlated with high scores for risks associated with 
economic troubles.  Furthermore, individualism and hierarchy were negatively correlated 
with risk scores for technological and environmental items.  These correlations were 
statistically significant, but they were not very high.  Another problem with these results was 
that the hierarchy and individualism scales were themselves strongly inter-correlated. 
 
In addition to these misgivings about the quantitative results of this study, we were 
concerned by an important gap in Dake's theoretical approach, in that it fails to address the 
role of social relations in shaping perceptions of risk.  An empirical test of cultural theory of 
risk would need to demonstrate three things.  Firstly, that the four types of cultural biases 
described by cultural theory can be identified.  Secondly, that four types of social relations 
(related to the grid and group dimensions) can be identified.  And thirdly, that each cultural 
bias corresponded with the correct type of social relations, thus yielding four ways of life.  
Then, if risk was the theme of interest, the study would seek to identify correlations between 
the ways of life identified and attitudes toward risk.  Dake maintains that he can measure 
four cultural biases, and that these are related to differing risk perceptions.  Even if these 
claims were supported by more convincing data, they do not necessarily provide empirical 
support for cultural theory, because the method ignores the second and third steps outlined 
above, and therefore does not incorporate any functionalist analysis. 
 
Furthermore, cultural theorists appear to disagree about whether cultural biases (let alone 
social relations) should ever be investigated using individuals as the unit of analysis.  There 
appear to be (at least) two different versions of cultural theory.  The first version maintains 
that individuals will choose to attach themselves to institutions with the same type of social 
organisation in different spheres of their lives (e.g. at home, at work, in leisure activities), 
and will therefore adhere consistently to the same cultural bias whatever social context they 
find themselves in.  This version also implies that individuals will conform to the same 
cultural bias over time.  The second version of cultural theory puts more focus on the 
institutional context and claims that individuals might move between institutions with different 
grid and group characteristics (in different spheres of their lives, or over time), and will 
adhere to different cultural biases as they move from one type of institution to another.  
Thompson is the most vocal proponent of this second 'mobility' version of cultural theory, 
and suggests that an analysis of the way in which individuals (or groups of individuals, such 
as a household or a nation) move from one cultural bias to another (over time or space) is, in 
itself, a rewarding subject for cultural analysis (Thompson, 1992; Thompson et al., 1990).  
Douglas, in contrast, tends to promote the more stable version of cultural theory, where 
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individuals adhere to the same type of institution, and the same cultural bias, throughout 
their lives. 
 
This ambiguity among cultural theorists has important implications for developing 
methodologies to test the theory empirically.  If the 'mobility' hypothesis is adopted, then the 
cultural bias exhibited by an individual will depend upon the social context in which it is 
elicited, and Dake's methodology, in which a questionnaire is administered to individuals in 
an abstract social setting, would not seem appropriate.  Cultural biases would, instead, have 
to be elicited within a specific social context purposefully chosen for the study in question.  
Dake and Thompson (1993) propose to resolve the debate by making a distinction between 
the type of worldviews identified using Dake's statements and cultural biases, as defined by 
cultural theory: "We characterise worldviews as 'orienting dispositions' when referring to the 
individual level of analysis and as 'cultural biases' when referring to collectively held beliefs 
and values" (Dake and Thompson, 1993, p. 435).  They do not, however, elaborate any 
further about the relationship between 'orientating dispositions' and 'cultural biases'. 
 
Cultural theory provides a useful lesson for policy-makers, who tend to seek to base risk 
management decisions upon a single vision of rationality, based on universal, objective, 
truths (e.g. technical risk assessments based upon the best available scientific evidence, or 
cost-benefit analysis).  Those who fail to accept such decisions are judged to be misguided, 
and the solution to risk controversies is seen to lie either in the education of the ignorant lay 
public, or the exclusion of extremist 'irrational' organisations.  Such an approach has 
repeatedly been shown to fail to resolve controversies.  Cultural theory argues that, within 
each worldview, attitudes about risks and how they should be managed will seem entirely 
rational.  It therefore helps to explain why risk controversies persist, and suggests alternative 
approaches to risk management which might prove more productive.  Schwarz and 
Thompson (1990), as implied in the title of their book, "Together we Stand", argue that since 
the four cultures define themselves in opposition to the others, society can only be viable 
when all four cultures are expressed.  Therefore, viable solutions to societal issues, 
including environmental problems, will only be reached if the existence and validity of each 
of the separate cultures is acknowledged.  (See Marris et al., 1996 for a fuller review and 
critique of the cultural theory of risk). 
 
1.4 Redefining the cultural context of risk perceptions 
Both the 'psychometric paradigm' and cultural theory have contributed useful insights into 
the underlying dimensions involved in shaping risk perceptions.  The former has been strong 
on methodology and empirical results, but weaker in terms of a theoretical framework to 
explain the findings.  Cultural theory, on the other hand, proposes a potentially interesting 
theoretical framework, but this has not been backed up by substantive empirical studies.  
We argue that both culture and cognition play important roles in shaping, maintaining, and 
changing views about risks, and that these two components are inter-related in complex 
ways.  We therefore decided to investigate risk perceptions using both the 'psychometric 
paradigm' and cultural theory approaches simultaneously. 
 
One of the main points of contention between the psychological and cultural approaches - 
and indeed also among cultural theorists - is whether it is appropriate to use individuals, 
rather than institutions, as the unit of analysis for risk perception studies.  Douglas (1986) 
has argued that methods which use individuals as the unit of analysis (such as questionnaire 
surveys) will always fail to elicit in any meaningful way the social factors involved.  Since we 
wanted to investigate individual traits and experiences together with social and institutional 
constraints, we developed a methodology which focused on both levels of analysis: at the 
level of individuals, using a questionnaire survey, as well as at a collective level, using focus 
groups.  In addition, and in order to investigate the relationship between grid-group 
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dimensions and cultural biases, some of our respondents were selected on the basis that 
they were associated with institutions with specific grid and group characteristics. 
 
This paper reports the results from the structured questionnaire survey.  Results from the 
focus groups will be published separately. 
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2. Sample A 
 
Two separate samples were used in this survey.  Sections 3 to 11 of this paper refer only to 
Sample A.  The results from Sample B are given in Section 12.   
 
Sample A (N=131) was a cluster sample of residents of Norwich conducted in two stages.  
Four locations were chosen to give a range of different types of housing and hence residents 
with differing socio-demographic characteristics.  Each location was composed of adjoining 
streets with houses of one particular type, namely: 
 
Location 1:   small terraced and semi-detached houses on a council-built housing  
 estate;  
Location 2:   larger semi-detached houses;  
Location 3:   two streets of terraced houses; 
Location 4:   very large houses with large gardens in a set of 'leafy avenues'. 
 
Approximately 100 houses were identified in each location, and interviewers were instructed 
to knock on each door at least three times until someone in the house had either agreed to 
respond to the questionnaire or stated that they did not wish to be involved.  In order to 
avoid biasing the sample towards people who tend to be at home all day, interviews were 
conducted only in the evenings and at week-ends.  In addition, and because the 
questionnaire was so long (it took 57 minutes to complete on average), respondents were 
offered a £5 cash incentive (89% of respondents accepted this payment).  The response 
rate varied from location to location (23% to 34%), with an overall mean response rate for 
the whole of sample of 30%, which fitted our expectations given the length of the 
questionnaire (see details below). 
 
Number of houses selected for survey 423 (100%) 
Number of homes which refused to participate 241 (57%) 
Number of homes where three calls were made with no contact 55 (13%) 
Number of home where at least one person was interviewed 127 (30%) 
 
The number of respondents was actually 131, rather than 127, because: three 
questionnaires were unusable; in five homes two people were interviewed; and in one home 
three people were interviewed. 
 
 
Socio-demographic profile of Sample A: 
 
• Gender was the only variable which was controlled for in the sampling strategy, and the 
male to female ratio was approximately equal. 
• All four locations had a spread of ages, but Location 3 had more respondents who were 
younger, and Location 4 more who were older middle-aged. 
• The income, social class and education of the respondents were closely inter-related and 
a good spread was obtained overall, which was what the cluster sample was designed to 
do. 
• The income, social class and education of respondents did vary significantly, as 
expected, between the four locations.  Location 1 had respondents with the lowest 
incomes, social classes and levels of education, while Location 4 had the highest.  
Locations 3 and 2 were in between, with 3 being 'lower' than 2. 
• Overall, the sample was biased towards higher social classes. Even in Location 1 
(council-built housing estate), only 8% of the respondents were from social classes III 
(manual), IV and V; furthermore, only 16% of the respondents were council-tenants.  This 
bias could be due to: (a) 'optimistic reporting' (social class was derived from the 
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respondent's description of their occupation or, where relevant, that of their partner);  
and/or (b) the reluctance of people with lower incomes, social classes and education to 
respond to interviews; and/or (c) a result of the cluster sample strategy and the small size 
of the sample; e.g. although Location 1 was council-built, most of houses in the particular 
streets sampled appeared to have been sold by the council, thus 50% of the respondents 
from Location 1 were owner occupiers, who were likely to be of higher social class than 
council tenants. 
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3. The Questionnaire 
 
The questionnaire was composed of five sections: 
 
1.  Classic 'psychometric paradigm' questions 
2.  Dake's cultural biases questionnaire 
3.  Scenarios about trust, liability and fairness 
4.  Health Locus of Control questionnaire1 
5.  Socio-demographic variables 
 
The 'psychometric paradigm' section of the questionnaire related to a set of thirteen risk 
issues.  The selection was based on two main criteria: firstly, to include risk issues from 
each of the four quadrants of the classic factor space generated from previous 'psychometric 
paradigm' studies; and secondly, to include risks which we hypothesised would be given 
more or less prominence by each of the four cultural biases (see Table 3.1). 
 
These thirteen risk issues were rated by the respondents according to nine of the risk 
characteristics proposed by Slovic et al. (1985).  The selection of risk characteristics (listed 
in Table 3.2) was based on two main criteria.  Firstly, to select characteristics which loaded 
heavily on each of the two factors 'dread' and 'unknown', in order to maximise our chances 
of reconstituting the same factor space as that described by Slovic et al..  Secondly, to 
select characteristics which we predicted might be interpreted differently, or given varying 
prominence, according to different cultural biases.  For example, 'unfairness' and 'harm to 
future generations' might be given more prominence within an egalitarian bias, 
'involuntariness' and 'lack of knowledge to those exposed' within an individualist bias, and 
'lack of knowledge to science' within a hierarchist bias. 
 
 
Analysis of the data from the questionnaire survey was designed to investigate the following 
questions: 
 
• Do 'psychometric paradigm' characteristics predict risk perceptions? (see Section 5.3) 
• Do cultural biases predict risk perceptions? (see Section 6.2) 
• Is there a relationship between cultural biases and 'psychometric paradigm' 
characteristics? (see Section 7) 
• Do socio-demographic characteristics predict risk perceptions? (see Section 8) 
• Is there a relationship between socio-demographic attributes and the risk characteristics 
proposed by the 'psychometric paradigm'? (see Section 9) 
• Is there a relationship between socio-demographic attributes and cultural biases? (see 
Section 10) 
• Which of the three types of variables (risk characteristics, cultural biases, and socio-
demographic attributes) predict risk perceptions best?  Does the 'psychometric paradigm' 
or cultural theory provide the best framework to understand risk perceptions? (see 
Section 11) 
                                                 
1
 The HLOC questionnaire was included because we believed that it might correlate closely 
with cultural biases, and might be able to help distinguish some of them (especially the 
fatalist) more clearly than Dake's questionnaire alone.  This data has not yet been analysed 
and is therefore not reported in this paper. 
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4. Risk Perceptions 
 
4.1 Five different definitions of risk perception 
Respondents were asked to rate thirteen risk issues on five different definitions of risk 
perception, namely: 
 
Riskiness: 
"On a scale of 1 to 5, how much risk do you think is associated with ... [each of the thirteen 
risk issues]?" 
 
Fatalities: 
"On a scale of 1 to 5, how many people do you think die every year as a consequence of... 
[each of the thirteen risk issues]?" 
 
Injuries: 
"On a scale of 1 to 5, how many people do you think are injured or become ill as a 
consequence of... [each of the thirteen risk issues]?" 
 
Environmental Harm: 
"On a scale of 1 to 5, how much harm do you think is done to things other than people as a 
consequence of ... [each of the thirteen risk issues]?" 
 
Unacceptability: 
"On a scale of 1 to 5, how acceptable do you feel the current risk is for ... [each of the 
thirteen risk issues]?" 
 
Throughout the rest of this paper, the terms 'Riskiness', 'Fatalities', 'Injuries', 'Environmental 
Harm' and 'Unacceptability' are used as abbreviations for responses to these questions. 
 
As shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.22, the mean risk perception ratings were different depending 
on which question was being answered.  In particular: 
• Risk issues tended to be rated higher on the Riskiness and Unacceptability scales.  Ten 
of the risk issues had mean ratings above 3.0 (the mid-point) on the Riskiness scale, and 
nine of these also had mean ratings above 3.0 on the Unacceptability scale.  Far fewer of 
the risk issues had mean ratings above 3.0 on the other three scales of Fatalities (three 
risk issues), Injuries (five risk issues), and Environmental Harm (four risk issues). 
• Nuclear power, depletion of the ozone layer, and genetic engineering were rated, on 
average, fairly high on the Riskiness scale (3.7 and above), but relatively low on the 
Fatalities and Injuries scales (2.7 and below). 
• On the other hand, food colourings and microwave ovens were rated low on all the 
scales. 
 
Table 4.3 lists correlations between mean scores for the five different definitions of risk, and 
reveals that: 
• Fatalities and Injuries were so highly correlated (0.96) that they were essentially 
measuring the same thing. 
• Riskiness was much more highly correlated to Environmental Harm (0.63) and 
Unacceptability (0.69) than to Fatalities (0.33) and Injuries (0.38). This demonstrated that 
'riskiness', when left undefined, did not seem to be inter-preted in relation to the expected 
number of fatalities and injuries. This was consistent with the results obtained by Slovic 
and his colleagues (e.g. Slovic et al., 1982), and indicates that expert definitions of risk, 
                                                 
2
 These tables, and all tables in Sections 4 to 11, relate only to results from Sample A.  
Results from Sample B are described in Section 12. 
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which are usually based only on the expected number of fatalities and injuries, fail to take 
into account other dimensions of risk which are of importance to the public. 
• Fatalities and Injuries were, however, closely correlated with Unacceptability, even 
though they were not correlated with Riskiness or Environmental Harm.  Indeed, 
Unacceptability was highly correlated with all the other four definitions of risk, and it 
seems that this dimension of 'risk' was the one which encompassed the other four.  
Hence, the issue of unacceptability was pursued in the focus groups, and in particular the 
potential link between unacceptability and issues such as trust and accountability. 
 
These results confirmed that risk can be interpreted in different ways, and that there is no 
single, universally accepted definition of risk.  Researchers in the field of risk perception 
need to be aware of this, and of which definition of 'risk perception' they are using.  To some 
extent, the 'psychometric paradigm' and cultural theory are using different definitions, and 
this explains their different approaches.  Thus, the interpretation of risk perceptions within 
the 'psychometric paradigm' appears to be closely related to the concept of dread, whereas 
within cultural theory the concept of risk is perhaps more closely associated with 
unacceptability (of the risk issue itself, and also of the institutional structures associated with 
it). 
 
4.2 Variability in risk perception ratings 
Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 were based on mean risk ratings for the whole of Sample A, and do 
no indicate whether there was any variability between respondents in the risk ratings they 
gave to particular risk issues.  Thus although nuclear power was, on average, the issue 
rated most highly rated on the Riskiness scale, this does not necessarily indicate that all 
respondents felt that nuclear power was the most 'risky' issue on the list.  Closer inspection 
of the data revealed that in some cases most of the respondents agreed about whether an 
issue was, or was not, risky, but in other cases there was no such consensus (see Table 
4.1).  For example, at least 85% of respondents rated nuclear power high on the Riskiness 
scale (and gave it a score of 3, 4 or 5).  Similarly, at least 85% of respondents rated 
microwave ovens low on the Riskiness scale (and gave it a score of 3, 2 or 1).  On the other 
hand, there was no such consensus about the Riskiness rating of war, car driving or AIDS 
and the respondents' scores were spread right across the 5 point scale for these issues. 
 
Microwave ovens were the only risk-issue which was rated very similarly by all respondents 
across all five definitions of 'risk'.  For all the other risk issues, there was some variability 
among respondents for at least one of the risk definitions.  It is, for example, interesting to 
note that, for nuclear power, there was consensus on the Riskiness and Fatalities scales, 
but not for Unacceptability.  The same applied to sunbathing and genetic engineering, 
indicating that all respondents agreed that these issues were 'risky', but disagreed about 
whether this meant that the risks were acceptable or not.  On the other hand, most 
respondents felt that the 'social ills' in the list (war, AIDS and terrorism) were unacceptable.   
 
Variability in the scores given by respondents to the same risk issue may reflect different risk 
perceptions, but might also indicate that the risk issues and defi-nitions of 'risk' were 
interpreted differently by different respondents (see Section 7).  The rest of this paper 
attempts to understand and explain what lays behind the variability in this data, but it is 
worth remembering that, in some cases, there was actually very little variation in the scores 
given by different respondents. 
 
4.3 Risk targets 
Responses to risk perception questionnaires also depend on 'risk to whom?'.  Sjöberg and 
Drottz-Sjöberg (1994) argue that it is important to specify the risk target when conducting 
surveys about risk perception, since responses will vary according to whether people are 
thinking about themselves, their family and friends, people in their country, or people in the 
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whole world.  Their studies suggest that respondents will, overall, rate 'general risk' (to 
people in their country) higher than 'personal risk' (to themselves), but that this does not hold 
for all risk issues.  For example, alcohol tends to be rated lower as a personal risk than a 
general risk (this phenomenon is sometimes referred to as 'optimistic bias').  It is important to 
remember, however, that even when a question is carefully formulated to clarify the risk 
target, it will always be selectively interpreted by respondents.  Thus, although Slovic's 
original survey asked respondents "to consider the risk of dying as a consequence of this 
activity or technology", the main finding of the study was that respondents took into account 
many factors other than the probability of dying, such as voluntariness, 'catastrophic 
potential', degree of control, etc. (Slovic et al., 1985).  Respondents cannot be expected to 
answer such questions about risk in the abstract, and will of course always set them within 
their own social context. 
 
This is precisely the issue which brings the 'psychometric paradigm' and cultural theory 
approaches to risk perception together, and is the focus of this research.  The risk target 
was therefore left purposefully vague in our questionnaire, and the way in which 
respondents interpreted the questions on risk perception was explored by integrating data 
from the 'psychometric paradigm' and cultural theory sections of the questionnaire (see 
Section 7).  Qualitative data was also collected during the interviews and at subsequent 
focus groups, and this suggested that the risk targets respondents had in mind varied from 
question to question.  Respondents seemed to feel that some of the thirteen issues were 
most relevant to them personally (e.g. mugging), and rated these according to perceived risk 
to themselves and those close to them, while other issues were seen to be more global in 
nature (e.g. ozone depletion) and were rated according to perceived risk to the whole world.  
It must be stressed, however, that the sets of issues which were considered 'personal' or 
'global' risks were not necessarily the same for each respondent.  For example, AIDS was 
perceived by some as a personal issue related to individual behaviour, while for others, who 
had in mind the epidemic in Africa, it was perceived as a global issue. 
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5. Analysis of the 'Psychometric Paradigm' Data 
 
5.1 Factor analysis 
The questionnaire incorporated a set of classic 'psychometric paradigm' questions, adapted 
from Slovic et al. (1985).  Respondents were asked to rate thirteen different risk issues (see 
Table 3.1) in relation to nine specific risk characteristics (see Table 3.2).  In order to analyse 
the relationship between these nine characteristics, a factor analysis using maximum 
likelihood estimation was performed on the mean responses from Sample A to each of the 
thirteen risk issues for the nine risk characteristics.  A varimax rotation was used to increase 
the loadings and three orthogonal factors were extracted which had statistically significant 
eigenvalues (i.e. greater than unity).  These three factors explained 34%, 33% and 24% of 
the variation in the mean responses respectively.  Table 5.1 lists that highest correlations 
between the risk characteristics and rotated factors and Figure 5.1 shows where the thirteen 
risk issues fall within the factor-space generated by Factors 1 and 2. 
 
Factor 1 appeared to correspond to the type of consequences expected when a risk was 
realised, i.e. whether the effects will be delayed, will affect future generations, or harm a 
large number of people at once.  Factor 2, in contrast, appears to correspond to the nature 
of the exposure to the risks, i.e. whether people have a choice about their exposure, and 
whether the risks and benefits from an activity are distributed fairly.  'Lack of knowledge to 
science' also fell into this factor.  Factor 3 essentially consisted of the 'lack of knowledge to 
those exposed' characteristic, which is discussed further below.  'Dread' was significantly 
correlated to all three factors, and 'severity' to Factors 1 and 3; hence these characteristics 
could not be exclusively allocated to a particular factor.  The fact that 'dread' was correlated 
with all the factors was neither surprising nor unusual: in the very first study using the 
'psychometric paradigm' (Fischhoff et al., 1978), 'dread' was also highly correlated with two 
of the factors. 
 
The results from this factor analysis should, however, be viewed with caution, because the 
number of risk issues was small relative to the number of risk characteristics.  The factors 
generated by factor analysis were, however, broadly confirmed by hierarchical cluster 
analysis (see Figure 5.2).  An average linkage method was used for building the clusters, 
which uses the mean distance between cluster members to successively allocate the 
characteristics to clusters.  The Y axis on the graph represents the degree of similarity 
between characteristics.  'Delayed effects', 'catastrophic potential' and 'harm to future 
generations' formed one cluster (equivalent to Factor 1); and 'involuntariness', 'unfairness' 
and 'lack of knowledge to science' formed a second cluster (equivalent to Factor 2), with 
'severity' and 'dread' being very similar and forming a third cluster.  Furthermore, the cluster 
analysis confirmed that 'lack of knowledge to those exposed' was relatively unrelated to the 
other eight risk characteristics. 
 
Correlations between mean scores for each pair of risk characteristics are listed in Table 
5.2, and these revealed a number of interesting relationships. 
 
• Both 'dread' and 'harm to future generations' correlated significantly with all the other risk 
characteristics except 'lack of knowledge to those exposed' and' lack of knowledge to 
science'.  'Dread' and 'harm to future generations' were also very highly correlated to 
each other (0.85).  This indicated that these two risk characteristics encompass key 
concepts which perhaps underlie all the other dimensions measured (except those 
relating to knowledge). 
• 'Severity' and 'dread' were very highly correlated to each other (0.90), indicating that 
whether of not people are likely to die when a risk is realised is an important component 
of the 'dread' dimension. 
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• 'Unfairness' and 'involuntariness' were very highly correlated to each other (0.96), 
indicating that whether or not people have a choice about their exposure to a risk is an 
important component of fairness.  Indeed, the strength of this correlation suggests that 
these two scales may actually be measuring the same thing. 
• 'Lack of knowledge to science' correlated significantly only to 'unfairness' and 
'involuntariness', and even these correlations were not very high, indicating that this 
characteristic is relatively unrelated to the other eight. 
• 'Lack of knowledge to those exposed' was only correlated with 'severity', and this was the 
only correlation which was negative, indicating that the more knowledge the respondents 
felt those exposed to the risk had, the more severe they perceived it to be. 
 
This last result, about 'lack of knowledge to those exposed', is contrary to results from 
previous studies using the same methodology (e.g. Slovic et al., 1980, see Table 5.3).  In 
our study, 'lack of knowledge to those exposed' was negatively correlated with all the other 
risk characteristics (except lack of knowledge to science), but in previous studies the 
correlations were positive.  In addition, in this study, 'lack of knowledge to science' was only 
closely related to 'severity', whereas in studies conducted by Slovic et al., it was related most 
closely to 'involuntariness' and 'delayed effects', and was not significantly correlated to 
'severity'.  The 'lack of knowledge to science' dimension therefore appears to be behaving 
very differently in this study.   
 
These differences could be due to a combination of factors (but see also Section 5.2): 
1. the specific selection of risk issues (and risk characteristics) chosen for our study; 
and/or 
2.  differences in perception over time between 1980 and 1995; and/or 
3. differences between the UK and the USA and other countries where 'psychometric 
paradigm' studies have been conducted. 
 
5.2 Variability in the ratings of the nine risk characteristics 
Are the risk characteristics proposed by the ' psychometric paradigm' universal?  i.e. are the 
concepts of 'catastrophic potential', 'involuntariness', 'dread', etc. interpreted in the same 
way by all respondents? 
 
The early risk perception studies which established the 'psychometric paradigm' used only 
mean scores, and Slovic et al. (e.g. 1985) did not discuss whether (or not) there was any 
variability in the scores respondents gave to a specific risk issue on any one characteristic.  
Furthermore, the way in which the authors reported the results from their studies implied that 
the risk characteristics were universal.  The assumption seemed to be that the 
characteristics were inherent features of risk and these formed the basis of the classification 
of risks displayed in the classic factor-space diagram.  In order to examine the validity of this 
assumption, this section takes a closer look at the variation in individual scores given to the 
'psychometric paradigm' scales. 
 
Inspecting the scores given by individual respondents to each risk issue for each risk 
characteristic revealed that in some cases there was a virtual consensus.  For example, 119 
out of 131 respondents scored 1 or 2 for war on 'lack of knowledge to scientists', indicating 
that 91% of the respondents felt that the risks associated with war were well known by 
scientists.  In other cases, however, there was no such consensus.  For example, when 
scoring 'involuntariness' for 'accidents in the home', 41 respondents felt this issue was 
voluntary (and gave it a score of 1 or 2) but a similar number (38), felt it was involuntary (and 
gave a score of 4 or 5).  Hence, the mean score of 3.0 for this issue obscured the polarised 
opinions of the respondents.  Table 5.4 lists the mean scores given to each risk issue for 
each risk characteristic, and indicates which scores were similar for all respondents and 
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which ones were not.  Previous studies using the 'psychometric paradigm' have not 
presented this kind of data. 
 
Table 5.4 demonstrated that the scores for 'lack of knowledge to those exposed', 'unfairness' 
and 'dread' showed great variability, while those for 'severity' and 'lack of knowledge to 
scientists' showed more consensus.  This suggested that the more ambiguous 
characteristics had more variability.  For example, qualitative feedback from the respondents 
during the interviews and the subsequent focus groups indicated that the questions relating 
to 'severity' and 'lack of knowledge to scientists' did not pose any difficulty to respondents, 
and were therefore likely to be interpreted in the same way by most respondents.  One 
exception was in relation to 'lack of knowledge to scientists' for mugging, where some 
respondents felt that scientific knowledge was irrelevant, and this score did, indeed, show 
more variability.  In contrast, many respondent found the phrasing of the question on 
'unfairness' difficult to interpret (see Table 3.2), and results from the focus groups indicated 
that at least three different dimensions were incorporated into the 'lack of knowledge to 
those exposed' characteristic. 
 
The first dimension was, as participants in the focus groups put it: "what you don't know 
about you don't worry", or: "ignorance is bliss until you know about it".  This attitude would 
lead to lower risk ratings for risk issues associated with a lack of knowledge.  Qualitative 
feedback during the questionnaire interviews suggested that, when rating the 'lack of 
knowledge to those exposed' characteristic, most of the respondents focused on the level of 
coverage the risk issues had received either in the media or through government sponsored 
public education campaigns.  This "ignorance is bliss" attitude therefore supports the idea 
that catastrophic events or accidents, and the coverage of risk in the media, can lead to an 
'amplification' of fears about risks (Kasperson, 1992).  The second dimension which was 
expressed in the focus groups would correlate with higher risk ratings for risk issues 
associated with a lack of knowledge: participants were more concerned about things which 
they felt they didn't know enough about, because they felt that more knowledge gave them 
more choice and control about their exposure to risks.  This was presumably the concept 
picked up in previous 'psychometric paradigm' studies, but the third dimension was almost 
exactly the opposite to this.  Participants felt very strongly that knowledge about risks was 
withheld from them deliberately, because those who had access to adequate knowledge, 
mostly people in powerful positions in government and companies, had vested interests 
which encouraged them to hide the extent of risks from the general public.  In this context, 
'lack of knowledge to those exposed' was interpreted as 'knowledge about risks which affect 
us is being withheld from us', and was associated with higher risk ratings.  It is important to 
stress that all three of these concepts were expressed in all the focus groups, and seemed 
to be held simultaneously by the participants.  The structured questionnaire did not enable 
the respondents to express these diverse and seemingly conflicting views, and they probably 
shifted between the three interpretations as they rated the 'lack of knowledge to those 
exposed' characteristic on the thirteen different risk issues.  This helped to explain the 
apparent inconsistency of the quantitative results obtained in relation to this characteristic, 
and suggested that issues such as trust, accountability and media exposure are important 
factors in determining individual responses to risks. 
 
Variability in the scores given to risk characteristics does not, therefore, necessarily reflect 
different opinions about the importance of a particular characteristic in relation to a specific 
risk issue.  It can also be due to different interpretations of the risk characteristics 
themselves.  This distinction between 'opinion' and 'interpretation' is, of course, equivocal.  
The quantitative data, alone, revealed no information about how the questions were 
interpreted by respondents, but qualitative feedback from respondents during the interviews, 
together with subsequent data from the focus groups, did provide some insights.  In addition, 
integration of the 'psychometric paradigm' methodology with cultural theory, discussed in 
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Section 7, revealed that some of the variability in the scores was related to the respondents' 
worldviews, indicating some differences in opinion rather than any 'misunderstanding' of the 
questions.  Variability in the scores listed in Table 5.4 could also be due to different 
interpretations of the risk issues.  Of the thirteen risk issues, food colourings, genetic 
engineering, mugging and car driving showed the most variability, and this was likely to be 
due to a combination of different interpretations of the issues themselves, as well as different 
opinions between the respondents (see Section 7). 
 
5.3 Explaining risk perceptions using the 'psychometric paradigm' 
Does the 'psychometric paradigm' help to explain risk perceptions?  And if so, which 
dimensions of 'risk' does it explain best? 
 
5.3.1 Relationship between risk characteristics and risk perceptions using mean 
scores 
Table 5.5 lists correlations between risk perceptions and mean scores given to the risk 
characteristics.  These results demonstrate that all but one of the risk characteristics ('lack of 
knowledge to scientists') helped to predict risk perception.  Interestingly, most of the 
significant correlations were revealed when 'riskiness' was either left undefined; or defined in 
terms of harm to things other than people; or unacceptability.  When 'riskiness' was defined 
in terms of the expected number of fatalities or injuries, only three of the risk characteristics 
appeared to have any influence: 'lack of knowledge to exposed', 'severity' (which was 
unsurprising since it was defined as 'likelihood of dying') and, to a lesser extent, dread.  
Unacceptability was the concept which correlated significantly with the highest number of the 
risk characteristics (7 out of 9). 
 
'Lack of knowledge to those exposed' was the only characteristic to be negatively correlated 
with risk perceptions.  This was consistent with the results discussed in the last section; 
thus, when people exposed to the risks have more knowledge, respondents thought it would 
cause more deaths and injuries, and felt that it was less acceptable.  Factor 3, which 
consisted essentially of this characteristic, was also negatively correlated with risk 
perceptions (see Table 5.5).  Factor 1 (type of consequences) was significantly correlated 
with risk perceptions, but only when defined as Riskiness or Environmental Harm, but Factor 
2 (nature of exposure) was not significantly correlated with risk perceptions, regardless of 
the definition used.  This was probably due to the fact that 'lack of knowledge to scientists', 
which was a component of Factor 2, was not correlated with risk perceptions. 
 
5.3.2 Relationship between risk characteristics and risk perceptions using individual 
scores 
In the previous section the mean risk perception scores for each risk issue (listed in Table 
4.1) were compared to the mean scores for each characteristic for each risk issue (listed in 
Table 5.4). This approach, however, ignores variation between responses given by different 
individuals.  For example, 131 respondents gave scores for the 'riskiness' of each of the 
thirteen risk issues, from sunbathing to alcoholic drinks; and also gave scores for the 
'delayed effects' caused by each of the thirteen risk issues.  The first cell in Table 5.5 
revealed that the correlation between Riskiness and 'delayed effects' was high (0.74) and 
significant (p < 0.01), indicating that risk issues which where, on average, thought to have 
many delayed effects were perceived as more 'risky' than those which had fewer delayed 
effects (this correlation is illustrated graphically in Figure 5.3).  This does not necessarily 
mean, however, that when an individual respondent felt that a specific risk-issue had many 
delayed effects, they always felt that it was very 'risky'. 
 
Similarly, Table 5.5 demonstrated that mean scores for Unacceptability were highly 
correlated with mean scores for 'unfairness' (0.78), suggesting that, on average, risks which 
were felt to be unfair were also perceived to be less acceptable.  This does not necessarily 
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mean, however, that when an individual felt that an issue, say nuclear power, was very 
unfair, they also perceived nuclear power as unacceptable.  In fact, further analysis 
(described below) revealed that the first relationship described above, between Riskiness 
and 'delayed effects' did hold true at the level of individuals, but that this second example, of 
the relationship between Unacceptability and 'unfairness', did not. 
 
In order to analyse the data at the level of individuals, correlations between risk perceptions 
and risk characteristics were determined using the scores given by each of the 131 
respondents, instead of the mean scores, and these are listed in Table 5.6 (see Figure 5.3 
for a graphical illustration of the difference between the correlations shown in Tables 5.5 and 
5.6).  For example, the first row of Table 5.6.1 gives the correlation between the Riskiness 
scores given to sunbathing by each of the 131 respondents and the scores those same 
respondents gave to sunbathing for each of the nine risk characteristics.  The correlation for 
'delayed effects' was 0.30, and was significant at the 99.9% level.  This indicates that the 
score an individual gave to the Riskiness of sunbathing was significantly correlated to the 
score that same individual gave to the 'delayed effects' of sunbathing: thus, if a respondent 
thought that sunbathing had many delayed effects, they also tended to feel it was very 'risky'. 
 
Many of the correlations listed in Table 5.6 were significant: out of the 585 correlations listed, 
364 (62%) were significant at the 95% level, indicating that the way in which a respondent 
rated the characteristics of a risk-issue was related to their perception of the 'riskiness' of 
that issue.  Most of the correlations between risk perceptions and risk characteristics using 
individual scores (listed in Table 5.6) were, however, much smaller than using mean scores 
(listed in Table 5.5).  Lower correlations achieved statistical significance in Table 5.6 
because there were 131 individual respondents, compared to only 13 risk issues (see Figure 
5.3).  It is important to stress that statistical significance, being a function of sample size, is 
not equivalent to substantive importance. 
 
Overall, the correlations in Table 5.6 broadly confirm the relationships demonstrated in Table 
5.5 and discussed in Section 5.3.1.  For example, Table 5.6 revealed that, at the level of 
individuals, 'harm to future generations' was significantly correlated with risk perceptions, 
regardless of which risk issue was being considered and which definition of 'risk' was used 
(the only exception was in relation to fatalities caused by genetic engineering).  'Dread' was 
also signifi-cantly correlated with risk perceptions across most risk issues and regardless of 
which definition of 'risk' was used.  This indicated again, in a different way, that these two 
dimensions appear to capture underlying concepts of great importance in the shaping of risk 
perceptions.  'Severity' was a third characteristics which was consistently related to risk 
perceptions for all thirteen risk issues when the data was analysed at the level of individuals 
(except when 'risk' was defined as Environmental Harm).  In contrast, the individual scores 
for 'lack of knowledge to science' were not related to risk perceptions: the correlations were 
not significant for any of the risk issues when risk was defined as Riskiness, Fatalities or 
Unacceptability, and only for one or two issues when 'risk' was defined as Injuries or 
Environmental Harm.  All these findings are consistent with those based on the mean scores 
and listed in Table 5.5. 
 
Some of the results shown in Table 5.6 were, however, at odds with those shown in Table 
5.5.  For example, 'unfairness' and Unacceptability were highly corre-lated when the data 
was analysed at the aggregate level (see Table 5.5), yet, at the level of individuals, 
'unfairness' was only correlated with Unacceptability for four out of the thirteen risk issues 
(see Table 5.6.5).  The difference between the aggregated and individual analysis was, 
however, most striking in relation to 'lack of knowledge to those exposed'.  When mean 
scores where used, a very strong correlation was found between 'lack of knowledge to those 
exposed' and risk perceptions defined as Injuries (see Table 5.5); yet when the same data 
was analysed at the level of individuals, this relationship did not hold true for any of the 
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thirteen risk issues (see Table 5.6.3).  The same was true when 'risk' was defined as 
Unacceptability, and, to a lesser extent, as Fatalities.  In short, 'lack of knowledge to those 
exposed' appeared to be very closely related to risk perceptions when the data was 
analysed using mean scores for all 131 respondents, but not at all related to risk perceptions 
when individual scores were used.  As discussed in Section 5.2, the focus groups revealed 
that the 'lack of knowledge to those exposed' characteristic was, in fact, composed of a 
number of dimensions (at least three) which different respondents used at different times in 
relation to different issues, and this is likely to explain these seemingly contradictory results.  
Similarly, qualitative feedback from the interviews revealed that respondents had difficulty 
understanding the question about unfairness, and interpreted it in a number of different 
ways.  
 
5.3.3 Relationship between risk characteristics and risk perceptions using all nine 
risk characteristics together 
Regression analyses of risk perceptions were performed using all nine risk characteristics 
together as the independent variables.  Table 5.7 lists the R2 values obtained and shows 
that, for all risk issues except war, the nine risk characteristics explained at least 14% of the 
variance in risk perceptions.  The highest R2 value obtained was 50%, for the 
Unacceptability of ozone depletion.  This indicated that, overall, the 'psychometric paradigm' 
did help to predict risk perceptions, but that the power of the model varied according to 
which risk issues, and which risk definitions, were used. 
 
5.4 Conclusions from the 'psychometric paradigm' data 
Respondents rated thirteen risk issues in relation to nine characteristics proposed by Slovic 
and his colleagues.  These could be resolved into three factors by factor analysis, but care 
should be taken when interpreting this analysis because the number of risk issues was small 
relative to the number of risk characteristics.  Despite this reservation, it was interesting to 
note that the first factor appeared to relate to the type of consequences expected when a 
risk is realised, whereas the second factor was related to the nature of the exposure to the 
risks.  The third factor essentially corresponded to 'lack of knowledge to those exposed'.   
 
Factors 1 and 3 were correlated with risk perceptions, but Factor 2 was not.  When analysed 
one at a time, eight out of the nine risk characteristics were closely related to risk 
perceptions.  The exception was 'lack of knowledge to science', which was not correlated 
with risk perceptions at all.   
 
Two characteristics, 'dread' and 'harm to future generations', appeared to encompass key 
concepts of importance in framing risk perceptions.  They correlated significantly with most 
of the other risk characteristics (all except the two relating to knowledge), and were highly 
correlated to risk perceptions (as well as to each other). 
 
'Lack of knowledge to those exposed' was relatively isolated from all the other risk 
characteristics, and was the only characteristic to correlate negatively to risk perceptions 
(and to the other characteristics).  Thus, all the other eight character-istics were associated 
with higher (i.e. 'worse') risk perceptions, whereas this one was associated with lower risk 
perceptions: the more knowledge available to the person exposed to the risk, the worse it is.  
This result was unexpected and was at odds with results from previous studies using the 
same methodology.  The negative correlation between 'lack of knowledge to those exposed' 
and risk perceptions did not, however, hold when the same data was analysed at the level of 
individuals instead of using mean scores for the whole sample. 
 
When the data was analysed using mean scores, the risk characteristics proposed by Slovic 
et al. were highly correlated with risk perceptions, but the correlations were much lower 
when the same data was analysed at the level of individuals.  Furthermore, some of the 
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correlations observed in the aggregate analysis disappeared completely when the data was 
analysed at the level of individuals.  There is, however, no contradiction here.  The 
difference occurs because of the different scale of the two analyses.  This is a well known 
statistical problem, sometimes called the ecological fallacy, which means it is wrong to say 
anything about the behaviour of individuals from results based on aggregated measures.  A 
possible statistical solution to this problem is to use a recently developed technique called 
multi-level modelling to model both individual and aggregated levels at the same time 
(Goldstein, 1995).  This technique has not been used in the field of risk perception before, 
and Ian Langford is working on developing a methodology to be applied here.  Problems 
only occur when researchers imply that results based on aggregated measures do provide 
information about individuals, and it seems that this mistake may have been made in the 
early interpretations of results from the 'psychometric paradigm' studies (e.g. Slovic et al., 
1982). 
 
Schütz et al. (1995) report similar disparities between individual and aggregate level 
analyses of data on risk perception related to consumer products and technologies in 
Germany.  In an aggregate level analysis of nine dimensions of risk for 30 risk issues, some 
very high correlations were found between the dimensions, for example, a correlation of 0.93 
between perceived personal risk and seriousness of injury.  Further, a principal components 
factor analysis of the nine dimensions produced one factor which explained 64% of the 
variance between risk issues, and a second factor which explained a further 21%.  However, 
when individual level analyses were performed for the 408 individuals in the study for each 
of the 30 risk issues, multiple R2 values for personal risk regressed against the other 
dimensions ranged between only 21% and 57%, and the relationship between personal risk 
and seriousness of injury varied markedly between risk issues.  Schütz et al. concluded that 
aggregate level analyses may obscure important aspects of the data, and that individual 
level analyses have greater potential for giving a true picture of how people judge risks.  The 
results reported here also support this conclusion.   
 
Overall, the 'psychometric paradigm' therefore appeared to be a relatively effective tool for 
predicting risk perceptions.  Taking all nine risk characteristics together, as much as 50% of 
the variance in risk perceptions could be explained, but the power of the model varied 
according to which risk issues, and which definitions of 'risk', were investigated. 
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6. Analysis of the Cultural Theory Data 
 
6.1 Measuring cultural biases 
6.1.1 Selection of questionnaire items 
Cultural biases were measured using items supplied by Karl Dake3.  The basis for this part 
of the questionnaire was the "British Edition" of "Dake's Cultural Biases Questionnaire" 
(Dake, 1991).  Previous studies had, however, demonstrated that this questionnaire did not 
provide a measure of four independent biases, and that, in particular, the hierarchy and 
individualism scales were strongly correlated (Dake, 1991 and 1992; Peters and Slovic, 
1996; Sjöberg, 1995; Brenot and Bonnefous, 1995; Seifert and Torgersen, 1995).  A number 
of adaptations were therefore made to this version of Dake's questionnaire in order to try 
and reduce the inter-correlations between the scales.  Some items from the British Edition 
were removed and replaced by items from other Editions used in other countries, as well as 
some items developed by Dake and Thompson for a large scale survey conducted in the UK 
and funded by Unilever4.  Results from the Unilever survey were used for the selection of 
items.  The Unilever items included a set of items devised to measure four distinct 
'behavioural strategies' associated with the four cultural biases (Dake and Thompson, 1993) 
and some of these were also included in our questionnaire5.  The set of items selected for 
the questionnaire is shown in Table 6.1.  Each item was scored on a 5-point scale from 1, 
"disagree strongly", to 5, "agree strongly". 
 
It is worth noting that Dake's Cultural Biases Questionnaire has generally been administered 
either through telephone interviews or self-completed by respondents.  The fact that this 
study used face-to-face interviews probably affected the responses, especially since the 
interviewers were young people who may have been perceived as 'environmentalists', and 
who introduced the study as being about the people's attitude to the environment.  It is 
possible that this encouraged respondents to react in a way which they felt was more 
environmentally sensitive than if they had completed the questionnaire anonymously, and 
this may be reflected in the high mean score for egalitarianism obtained from this survey 
(see Section 6.1.3). 
 
6.1.2 Cluster analysis 
Table 6.2.1 lists the correlations between the four scales obtained from our data and 
demonstrates that all the cultural biases were inter-correlated, except egalitarianism and 
fatalism.  Hierarchy and individualism were particularly highly correlated.  As shown in Table 
6.2.2, these results were, however, consistent with those reported by Dake (1991).  Peters 
and Slovic (1995) also reported that hierarchy and fatalism were confounded. 
 
In order to further investigate the nature of the items, hierarchical cluster analysis was 
performed.  Figure 6.1 illustrates the results from the cluster analysis when all the cultural 
bias items were included, and demonstrates that most of the items from the egalitarian and 
fatalism scales clustered together, but those from the hierarchy and individualism scales did 
not.  Sequential modifications were made to the set of items, by adding some of the 
                                                 
3
 We thank Karl Dake for kindly permitting us to use these items. 
4
 We thank Elizabeth Carter from Unilever, as well as Karl Dake and Michael Thompson, for 
permitting us to use these items. 
5
 The 'behavioural strategy' items were not used in the manner intended by Dake and 
Thompson (1993), who argue that behavioural strategies and cultural biases can and should 
be measured independently.  In this study the behavioural strategy items were used to 
measure cultural biases.  Furthermore, the behavioural strategy items were designed for the 
analysis of households rather than individuals (for this study, the pronoun "we" was 
replaced with "I"). 
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'behavioural strategy' items and removing some of the cultural bias items, until four more 
distinct clusters which still fitted with cultural theory were obtained.  Figure 6.2 shows the 
results from the cluster analysis performed on the set of items which was selected for use in 
the analysis of the data.  These are henceforth referred to as the 'UEA set', and are listed in 
Table 6.3.  Table 6.2.3 demonstrates that, using this 'UEA set' of items, correlations between 
the four scales were lower than when using all the cultural bias items from our questionnaire.  
Correlations between individualism and the other three scales were, however, still high, 
indicating that this cultural bias was still not clearly picked out.  Correlations between the 
other three cultural bias scales were 0.25 at most, and were not significant at the 95% 
confidence level, indicating that the scales for egalitarianism, fatalism and hierarchy were 
more reliable. 
 
6.1.3 Identifying cultural biases at the level of individuals 
Four cultural bias scores were calculated for each respondent.  This was done by adding up 
the scores the respondent had given for all the items attributed to each cultural bias and 
dividing it by the number of items being used for that cultural bias.  This resulted in a score 
between 1 and 5 for each cultural bias for each respondent.  If cultural theory worked well at 
the level of individuals, and if Dake's questionnaire items were an effective tool for 
measuring cultural biases6, respondents would be expected to have a high score for one 
particular cultural bias and a low score for the other three biases.  The results from this 
survey showed that this was not the case.  Most respondents had scores above 3 (the mid-
point) for more than one cultural bias.  Only 14% of the whole sample had only one score 
above 3.  On this basis, Sample A (N=1297) would have consisted of fourteen egalitarians, 
three hierarchists, one individualist, no fatalists, and two respondents with no cultural bias at 
all (all four scores below 3), with the remaining 110 respondents being of mixed cultural bias.  
This indicated either that Dake's questionnaire was not an effective tool to measure cultural 
biases and/or that cultural theory did not work at the level of individuals. 
 
The means for each of the cultural bias scores were not 3 (the mid-point), and were different 
for each cultural bias, namely: 3.4 for individualism, 3.8 for hierarchy, 3.7 for egalitarianism, 
and 2.3 for fatalism.  This indicated either that the sample was, in general, fairly high in 
hierarchy and egalitarianism but low in fatalism, or pointed to some bias in the particular set 
of questionnaire items used for this analysis.  In either case, it seemed appropriate to centre 
the respondents' scores around these means.  Using these centred scores, three different 
criteria were devised to identify the cultural bias of individual respondents, and the results 
are shown in Table 6.4. 
 
The first and most stringent criteria (A) stated that a respondent had to have one score well 
above the mean for the sample (at least 0.5 points), while the other three scores had to be 
below the mean.  This system only enabled 21 respondents out of 129 (16%) to be allocated 
to one single cultural bias (the others all being of mixed or no cultural bias at all).  Since a 
larger proportion of the sample needed to be categorised in order to select participants for 
the focus groups, two less stringent categorisation systems were devised.   
 
For criteria B the respondent simply had to have one score above the mean for the whole 
sample, and the other three scores below the mean.  This system allocated 41 out of 129 
(32%) of the respondents to a single cultural bias category.  Considering that only 56% of 
the respondents had indicated that they were willing to attend focus groups, and that 10 
                                                 
6
 Note that Dake never intended his questionnaire to be used in this way. 
7
  The sample used for analysis in Section 6 consists of 120 respondents, rather than 131, 
because two respondents did not answer the full set of cultural bias items and were 
therefore excluded from the analysis. 
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participants from each cultural bias were needed for the focus groups, an even less stringent 
system was devised. 
 
Criteria C included respondents who fitted criteria B, but also some who had more than one 
score above the mean: one score had to be well above the mean for the whole sample (at 
least 0.5 points) while the other three scores could also be above the mean as long as they 
were less than 0.5 points above the mean.  This system allocated 59 out of 129 (46%) of the 
respondents to single cultural bias categories, and was the one used for the selection of 
participants for the focus groups8. 
 
Overall the set of questionnaire items used did not seem very effective for classi-fying 
individuals into one of the four cultural biases.  This indicated either a weakness in the 
methodology used, or that most individuals cannot be categorised in such a way.  It should 
be noted, however, that Dake never intended his questionnaire instrument to be used in this 
way.  The remainder of Section 6 treats cultural biases as 'worldviews' (or, as suggested by 
Dake and Thompson (1993), 'orientating dispositions').  Thus, for the correlations that follow, 
the spectrum of scores obtained by individuals on each of the four scales was used; and 
individuals were not categorised into cultural bias groups.  This is also the way in which 
Dake (1991 and 1992) used this questionnaire instrument. 
 
6.2 Explaining risk perceptions using cultural theory 
Do cultural biases help predict risk perception?  And if so, which dimensions of 'risk' do they 
explain best? 
 
The correlations between cultural biases and risk perceptions obtained are listed, for each 
definition of risk perception, in Table 6.5.  None of the correlations between cultural biases 
and risk perceptions were very high.  The highest correlation obtained was 0.34, which 
means that the R2 value was 0.11, indicating that, at most, only 11% of the variance in risk 
perceptions could be explained by the worldview held by respondents.  However, 77 
correlations out of the 260 in Table 6.5 (i.e. 30%) were significant at the 95% confidence 
level.  Only thirteen would be expected to be significant simply by random variation, 
indicating that the correlations obtained, although weak, are likely to be meaningful if 
examined collectively.  Moreover, the pattern which emerged was distinct for each cultural 
bias and was consistent with the predictions of cultural theory (see below). 
 
Correlations between cultural biases and risk perceptions were not the same depending on 
which of the five definitions of risk perception was scored by the respondents.  The greatest 
number of significant correlations were revealed when risk was defined as Riskiness, 
Environmental Harm or Unacceptability, rather than in terms of Fatalities or Injuries.  This 
confirmed, yet again, that these five scales were not measuring the same thing, and 
suggested that cultural theory is more closely related to the concept of unacceptability rather 
than to estimates of human fatalities and injuries.   
 
For the sake of simplicity Table 6.6 summarises the results across all five definitions of risk 
perception, i.e. it shows statistically significant correlations (between cultural biases and risk 
perceptions) obtained using any one of the definitions of risk.  This table is the one used for 
the discussion below. 
 
When devising this survey, twenty five predictions were made about the relationship 
between cultural biases and risk perceptions of the thirteen risk issues included in the 
                                                 
8
 Results from the focus groups indicated that respondents with 'pure' cultural biases, as 
determined using criteria C, did hold worldviews which corresponded strikingly to the 
archetypes proposed by cultural theory. 
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questionnaire (Marris et al., 1996).  The predictions were derived from Douglas and 
Wildavsky (1982); Thompson et al. (1990); Dake (1991); Jenkins-Smith (1994); and Peters 
and Slovic (1996) and are reproduced in Table 3.1.  No prediction were made for fatalism 
because cultural theorists have not discussed the relationship between fatalism and risk 
perception in much depth.  Table 6.6 shows that, out of the twenty five predictions listed in 
Table 3.1, eighteen were proven.  Only seven of the hypothesised relationships were not 
proven: three of these showed no relationship at all, while the remaining four showed 
relationships in the opposite direction from what had been expected.  Fourteen cells were 
left blank in Table 3.1, indicating that no relationship was expected or that the relationship 
was not easily predictable from the theory.  Of these, five revealed no significant 
correlations, and the remaining nine did.  The lack of correlations in these cases should not 
be taken as a failure, and can be considered to represent positive results. 
 
An egalitarian worldview was, as expected, correlated with high risk perceptions for 
environmental threats of a potentially catastrophic nature such as nuclear power and the 
depletion of the ozone layer; and also for risks perceived as 'unnatural' such as food 
colourings, genetic engineering and microwave ovens (previous research at UEA has shown 
that food colourings, genetically manipulated foods and microwave ovens are perceived as 
'unnatural' by many members of the public, and that this influences their perception of these 
risk issues (Simpson 1994)).  The hierarchical worldview was, as expected, associated with 
high scores for social threats such as mugging and terrorism .  The individualist worldview 
was, as expected, characterised by low concern for environmental threats (nuclear power 
and ozone depletion), and also low concern for risks which would be perceived, within an 
individualist worldview, as 'personal risks' (alcoholic drinks, car driving, food colourings). 
Cultural theorists have also argued that individualists would be particularly concerned about 
war.  The results from this survey, however, showed a negative correlation between 
individualism and risk perception ratings for war, indicating that the individualist worldview 
correlated with low concern for war.  This may be due to changes in the nature of wars over 
the last decade.  Thompson says that "war (unlike mugging or terrorism) is a terrible threat 
for individualists, because it massively reduces the scope for biding and bargaining and 
plays havoc with contract security"9.  While this may be true of wars such as the First and 
Second World Wars, it does not necessarily apply to smaller scales wars taking place away 
from one's country or region of residence.  The war most uppermost in the respondents' 
minds was likely to be the current war in the Balkans10, which had had little or no effect on 
economic activities in the UK.   
 
Some interesting unpredicted relationships were also revealed by the data, for example in 
relation to genetic engineering and car driving.  With regards to car driving, the results 
showed, as expected, low concern from an individualist perspective, and this was 
presumably because car driving was considered, within an individualist worldview, to be a 
personal choice and within one's control.  But the results also showed an unpredicted 
correlation between egalitarianism and high risk perceptions for car driving.  This correlation 
was only revealed, however, when risk was defined in terms of 'harm to things other than 
people' and unacceptability.  This suggests that egalitarian and individualist worldviews lead 
to different interpretations of the risks associated with 'car driving': individualism seems to be 
associated with a focus on fatalities and injuries caused by road traffic accidents, whereas 
the egalitarian perspective focuses mostly the environmental effects of car emissions and 
road building.  Thus, within an individualist worldview, car driving was perceived as a 
                                                 
9
 Letter from Michael Thompson to Claire Marris dated 6/10/95. 
10
 The interviews were usually conducted when the respondents had just been watching the 
evening Television news, with the Balkans war as a headline.  Association of 'war' with the 
Balkans war was also confirmed in the focus groups. 
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personal risk, whereas within an egalitarian worldview, it was perceived as an environmental 
threat11. 
 
Genetic engineering was expected to be selected for attention within an egalitarian 
worldview, because it would be considered to be 'unnatural', have potentially catastrophic 
environmental consequences, be controlled by untrustworthy scientists and promoted by 
profit-motivated commercial enterprises.  In contrast, it was expected to be of little concern 
from the individualist and hierarchical perspectives.  The results showed that egalitarianism 
did indeed correlate with concern for genetic engineering, but that hierarchy (and fatalism) 
did too.  This could be due to the ethical and moral issues associated with genetic 
manipulation of human beings (qualitative feedback from respondents during the interviews 
indicated that some of them interpreted the term 'genetic engineering' mostly in relation to 
human genetics and reproductive technologies12).  Hierarchy had not been expected to be 
correlated with concern about microwave ovens or food colourings either, yet the results 
showed positive correlations for these issues.  It therefore seems that the hierarchy, like 
egalitarianism, was correlated with concern about 'unnatural' risks (food colourings, 
microwave ovens and genetic engineering), but, in contrast to egalitarianism, hierarchy was 
not correlated with concern about environmental threats (nuclear power and ozone 
depletion). 
 
Ozone depletion had been expected to be of concern within a hierarchical worldview 
because scientific experts, national governments and international agencies have given it a 
lot of attention.  Thus, within a view of Nature as perverse/tolerant, it could be seen as an 
environmental threat which went beyond the critical limits of environmental tolerance.  In 
contrast, within an individualist worldview, this issue was expected to be seen as having 
been 'blown out of proportion', since Nature is perceived as being infinitely tolerant and no 
implicit trust is placed in scientific expertise.  The results, however, revealed that both 
hierarchy and individualism were negatively correlated with risk perception for ozone 
depletion, indicating little concern for this issue.  It is possible that the conflicting statements 
made by different experts on this subject has led to a higher level of distrust in scientific 
opinions, even within a hierarchical worldview.  This result may also be due to the fact that 
hierarchy and individualism were not clearly distinguished. 
 
The results from this survey showed fewer significant correlations between risk perceptions 
and fatalism than for the other three cultural biases, and no clear pattern emerged.  Fatalism 
was correlated with concern about social ills such as mugging and AIDS, but not war or 
terrorism.  This suggested that fatalism was associated with concern about things which 
were more likely to affect respondents directly.  On the other hand, fatalism was not 
correlated with concern about home accidents which also affects individuals directly; but 
maybe accidents are simply things which 'happen' and 'one just has to put up with them'.  
Fatalism was not correlated with concern for environmental threats such as nuclear power or 
ozone depletion, but was correlated with concern about genetic engineering.  Interestingly, 
fatalism was the only cultural bias which revealed no significant correlations at all when risk 
perception was defined in terms of unacceptability (see Table 6.5.5), indicating, perhaps, 
that accepting something - or not accepting it - it not a concept which has much meaning 
within a fatalist worldview.  In contrast, egalitarianism was significantly correlated with high 
scores for Unacceptability for ten out of the thirteen risk issues. 
 
 
                                                 
11
 This was confirmed in the focus groups.  See also Section 7: egalitarianism was the only 
cultural bias which was correlated with a perception of car driving as causing harm to 
future generations, having delayed effects, and possessing catastrophic potential. 
12
 This was also confirmed in the focus groups. 
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6.3 Relationship between cultural biases and trust in institutions 
Cultural biases were also expected to be related to the trustworthiness of institutions.  
Cultural theorists suggest that hierarchists place particular trust in people in positions of 
authority, such as the Government and doctors.  They should also trust scientists, who 
possess the 'facts' necessary to manage the environment within its tolerable limits; and 
respect religious organisations, because of their high morals.  Conversely, hierarchists 
would be expected to have little affinity with organisations fighting for more equality, such as 
trade unions; and environmental organisations would be perceived as being outside the 
expert system and therefore not trustworthy either.  Egalitarians, in contrast, should place 
very little trust in the Government, companies, and scientists, which they would perceived as 
being corrupted by vested interests and too much power.  Egalitarian organisations such as 
environmental groups and trade unions, would, however, be perceived as acting with the 
best interest of the public and the ecosystem in mind.  Individualists would be expected to 
trust companies, but would be suspicious of environmental organisations or trade unions, 
who would be perceived as acting against economic development. 
 
Respondents were therefore asked to rate ten different institutions on a 4 point scale from 
"never trust" to "always trust" "to tell you the truth about risks".  Table 6.7 lists correlations 
between cultural biases and responses to these questions about trust, and demonstrates 
that, as expected: individualism was correlated with trust in companies but not trade unions; 
and hierarchy was correlated with trust in hierarchical institutions such as the Government 
and religious organisations and also experts such as doctors and scientists.  Hierarchy was 
also correlated with high levels of trust in the family.  One surprising results was that 
individualism correlated with trust in the Government, and hierarchy with trust in companies.  
This may be due to the fact that these two cultural biases were not clearly distinguished. 
 
Egalitarianism, as expected, was correlated with trust in trade unions but not companies.  
Surprisingly, however, egalitarianism did not correlate with a positive attitude towards 
environmental organisations13, and for some reason, correlated positively with trust in 
religious organisations.   
 
Fatalism was correlated with high levels of trust in people the respondents felt closest to 
(their friends, family and doctor); and low levels of trust for the Government and 
environmental organisations, which were presumably both perceived as 'outsiders'. 
 
Some general trends are also worth noting.  Figure 6.3 shows the percentage of 
respondents in the whole of Sample A who said that they would "always" or "often" trust a 
particular institution to tell them the truth about risk.  Overall, the respondents showed very 
little trust in the Government, companies, and the media, but a lot of trust in family, friends, 
and environmental organisations. 
 
6.4 Relationship between cultural biases and environmentalism (and myths of 
Nature) 
The questionnaire also included a set of items devised by Dake and Thompson to measure 
'environmentalism'; and another set adapted from Jenkins-Smith (1994) to indicate which of 
the four 'myths of Nature' proposed by cultural theorists (Thompson et al., 1990; Schwarz 
and Thompson, 1990) was held by the respondents.  Table 6.8 indicates the correlations 
obtained between these items (labelled ENV 1 to ENV 11) and cultural biases.  The 
                                                 
13
 The term 'environmental organisations' was intended to refer to institutions such as Friends 
of the Earth and Greenpeace, but results from the focus groups revealed that it was not 
necessarily interpreted in this way by all respondents.  In some cases, it was interpreted as 
government departments dealing with environmental issues.  This may explain why 
correlations with this item were unexpectedly low. 
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correlations were still not very high, but they were higher than those obtained for risk 
perceptions or trust in institutions (the highest was 0.46).  Furthermore, many significant 
correlations were obtained, and the pattern was consistent with the predictions of cultural 
theory.   
 
Items ENV 1, 2, 3 and 4 were devised to reflect the individualistic, hierarchical, egalitarian 
and fatalist myths of Nature: 'Nature benign'; 'Nature perverse/tolerant'; 'Nature ephemeral'; 
and 'Nature capricious', respectively.  The results did, indeed, reveal a significant (and 
positive) correlation with the appropriate cultural bias for each of these four myths.  
Furthermore, egalitarianism correlated negatively with the individualistic myth of Nature.  
These myths, however, did not appear to be exclusive of one another; thus, individualism 
also correlated positively with the hierarchist myth, and fatalism with the egalitarian myth. 
Items ENV 5 to ENV 11 related to attitudes toward technology, industry and decision-making 
procedures, and, interestingly, the pattern of correlations obtained for individualism was 
exactly the opposite to that obtained for egalitarianism.  Three items suggested negative 
views about industry and private companies (ENV 5, 6 and 7) and all three correlated 
positively with egalitarianism.  Item ENV 8, which suggested that "the misuse of technology 
is a serious problem in the world today" was correlated positively with egalitarianism and 
negatively with individualism.  ENV 9, which advocated public participation in decision 
making was positively correlated with egalitarianism and negatively with individualism. 
 
Hierarchy (like individualism) was correlated positively with items 10 and 11, which 
suggested that there is too much legislation to protect the environment, and negatively with 
the statement "industry left to itself will harm the environment".  Hierarchy therefore 
appeared to be correlated with a very positive attitude towards industry and its ability to 
regulate itself, which was expected to be an archetypal individualist, rather than hierarchist, 
point of view. This may be due to the fact that the hierarchy and individualism scales were 
inter-correlated. 
 
Fatalism showed no consistent pattern vis-à-vis environmentalism: it correlated with a 
preference for public participation in decision making (ENV 9), which was an archetypal 
egalitarian statement, but also with the opinion that there was too much environmental 
legislation (ENV 10 and 11), which is an archetypal individualistic view.  Fatalism correlated 
most highly with the statement that "Big corporations are responsible for most of the evil in 
the world" (even more highly than egalitarians).  Perhaps this reflected a particularly 
pessimistic outlook associated with fatalism.  Qualitative feedback during the questionnaire 
inter-views indicated that respondents with an egalitarian worldview tended to find this 
statement rather 'over the top' even though they did feel that large multi-national companies 
were the cause of many of the world's problems. 
 
6.5 Relationship between cultural biases and membership of groups 
Table 6.9 shows the relationship between the respondents' membership of particular types 
of institutions and their cultural bias.  The results reveal that individualism, hierarchy and 
fatalism were correlated with an aversion to membership of environmental organisations, 
whereas egalitarianism correlated positively with membership of these organisations .  This 
confirms the results discussed in Section 6.4, suggesting that egalitarianism was closely 
related to environmentalism.  There was also an interesting difference between membership 
of 'environmental organisations' and 'conservation organisations'.  The former were defined 
as more radical institutions such as Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace, whereas the later 
were defined as more conservative and hierarchical institutions such as the National Trust or 
the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds.  The results showed that egalitarianism 
correlated with membership of environmental organisations but not with membership of 
conservation organisations; while hierarchy was correlated with an aversion to membership 
of environmental organisations but not of conservation organisations.  Individualism and 
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fatalism in contrast, were negatively correlated with membership of both types of 
organisations. 
 
Egalitarianism was also correlated with membership of trade unions; and individualism was 
correlated with membership of sports clubs, whereas egalitarianism was not.  For religious 
organisations and political parties, there was no relationship between membership and 
cultural biases. 
 
6.6 Relationship between cultural biases and responses to scenarios 
The questionnaire included three scenarios which were devised to address (in turn) issues 
of liability, fairness, and accountability. 
 
Scenario 1 on liability 
The question was: "Imagine you live near a chemical factory owned by a private company.  
How would you make sure the company was run safely?", and respondents were given four 
options: 
 
1.  "By making sure the company is liable and can be sued" (N=13) 
2. "By checking that there is a regulatory authority keeping an eye on the factory" 
(N=83) 
3. "By setting up a group of local residents with the power to influence the factory's 
activities" (N=30) 
4.  "By hoping for the best" (N=4) 
 
Analysis of variance indicated that egalitarians were more likely to chose the third response 
and individualists were more likely to chose the second response. 
 
Scenario 2 on fairness 
The question was "Imagine you work for a company which has been forced by recession to 
make two people redundant.  How do you think the managers should decide who should 
go?", and the four options were: 
 
1.  "The least productive workers should go" (N=58) 
2.  "The last two workers should go (last-in-first-out)" (N=30) 
3.  "The employees should be asked to decide between themselves" (N=21) 
4.  "Whatever happens, I won't be able to influence the decision" (N=20) 
 
Analysis of variance indicated that egalitarians were more likely to pick response 3 and 
fatalists more likely to pick response 4. 
 
Scenario 3 on accountability 
The question was "Imagine you decide to go on holiday with a tour company.  How would 
you make sure that the company is reliable?", and the four options were: 
1.  "By checking their annual reports and profit margins" (N=1) 
2. "By making sure that they are an old and well-established company" (N=86) 
3.  "By hoping for the best" (N=10) 
4.  "By asking to speak to previous customers" (N=32) 
 
Analysis of variance shoved no significant relationship with cultural biases.  Most 
respondents (67%) chose the third response, and indicated that they were no so much 
interested in whether the travel agent was old and established as whether it was a member 
of ABTA. 
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Overall, these scenarios did not reveal any particularly interesting results.  One reason for 
this was the homogeneity among responses (especially for Scenarios 1 and 3) indicating 
that, at least for the sample interviewed, the choice of options was not optimal to distinguish 
between different opinions.  Further development of the scenarios might improve this, but it 
is also possible that such scenarios, presented out of context within a structured interview, 
are not effective instruments for measuring cultural biases.   
 
6.7 Conclusions from the cultural theory data 
A modified version of the British Edition of Dake's Cultural Biases Questionnaire was used to 
measure cultural biases.  This revised version measured egalitarianism and fatalism 
effectively, but the hierarchy and individualism scales were still confounded.  When analysed 
at the level of individuals, only 14% of respondents could, strictly, be allocated to a single 
cultural bias, indicating either that the method used was not an effective tool to measure 
cultural biases, or that most individuals cannot be categorised in this way.  The scales could, 
however, be used as continuous 'worldview' scales, and this approach revealed interesting 
results. 
 
Correlations between cultural biases (used as continuous scales) and, in turn: risk 
perceptions, trust in institutions, environmentalism; myths of Nature; and membership of 
groups were measured.  Each cultural bias produced distinct patterns of correlations, and 
these were all consistent with the predictions of cultural theory.  None of the correlations 
obtained were very high: in particular only 11%, at most, of the variation in risk perceptions 
could be explained by cultural biases.  The number of significant correlations was, however, 
much higher than would be expected from random variation alone.  Thus, it was 
comparisons between the four cultural biases, considered collectively, which provided the 
most interesting insights, rather than any single correlation examined in isolation from the 
others. 
 
Stronger correlations between cultural biases and risk perceptions would probably be 
obtained if the questionnaire used to measure cultural biases was further developed.  
Dimensions such as worldviews are, however, by definition multi-dimensional and therefore 
difficult to measure using a questionnaire instrument of the type used here.  The fact that a 
consistent pattern emerged at all indicates that cultural theory does indeed seem to be able 
to provide insights into some of the underlying factors which shape risk perceptions. 
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7. Integrating the 'Psychometric Paradigm' and Cultural Theory Data 
 
Section 5.2 revealed that the risk characteristics used in the 'psychometric paradigm' were 
not rated in the same way by all respondents.  In this section, we investigate whether any of 
the variability observed in the scores from the 'psychometric paradigm' questions can be 
explained by differences in the worldviews held by the respondents.  Correlations between 
cultural bias scores and responses to the 'psychometric paradigm' scales were calculated in 
two different ways.  Table 7.1 lists correlations using the scores aggregated for all thirteen 
risk issues, and Table 7.2 lists correlations using scores for individual risk issues (both 
tables refer to scores for individual respondents). 
 
None of the correlations in Table 7.1 were significant for either individualism or hierarchy.  A 
few significant correlations were obtained for egalitarianism and fatalism, but these were not 
very high.  There was therefore no clear pattern of relationships between the cultural bias of 
respondents and their general tendency to rate risk characteristics high or low.  Even when 
the results were disaggre-gated by risk issue (see Table 7.2), the largest correlation was 
only 0.34, which meant that only 11% of the variation in the scores given to risk 
characteristics could be explained by cultural biases.  The number of significant correlations 
obtained, was, however, relatively high.  All together, for the nine risk character-istics, a total 
of 468 separate correlations were measured, and 103 of these (22%) were found to be 
significant at the 95% confidence level (see Table 7.2). 
 
'Harm to future generations' was the risk characteristic which revealed the higher number of 
significant correlations.  Table 7.2 shows that egalitarianism was correlated with high scores 
on this scale for many of the risk issues (7 out of 13), especially those perceived, within an 
egalitarian worldview, as environmental threats (nuclear power, ozone depletion, sunbathing 
and car driving).  In contrast, individualism and hierarchy tended to correlate with low scores 
on the 'harm to future generations' scale for all of the issues.  Indeed, the results suggested 
that, within a hierarchical worldview, it was social problems, rather than environ-mental 
threats, which were perceived as the issues with the most pervasive ill-effects on society.  
Thus, hierarchy was correlated with high scores on the 'delayed effects' and 'harm to future 
generations' scales with respect to mugging and terrorism, but low scores on these two 
scales with respect to environmental (nuclear power and ozone depletion) and 'unnatural' 
(genetic engineering and food colourings) risk issues.  This might also be because these 
were the risk issues for which there has been either uncertainty or conflicting opinions 
between official experts and public pressure groups about the potential for delayed or long-
lasting impacts.  Hierarchy was also correlated with high scores for the 'catastrophic 
potential' associated with mugging and terrorism, whereas, within the egalitarian worldview, 
it was environmental threats (genetic engineering, nuclear power, ozone depletion and car 
driving) which were perceived as having the greatest 'catastrophic potential'. 
 
Egalitarian views on nuclear power were particularly striking (see Table 7.2).  Egalitarianism 
correlated with higher scores for 'dread', 'involuntariness', 'catastrophic potential', 'harm to 
future generations', 'delayed effects', and 'severity'.  In contrast, for nuclear power, 
individualism and hierarchy correlated negatively with all these scales (though not always 
significantly so).  These results also confirmed that the egalitarian worldview led to a distinct 
outlook towards the risks associated with car driving.  Egalitarianism correlated with high 
scores for car driving on the 'harm to future generations', 'delayed effects', and 'catastrophic 
potential' scales.  Individualism, in contrast, correlated with low scores for harm to future 
generation caused by car driving.  This fitted in with the results discussed in Section 6.2, 
which suggested that the egalitarian worldview considers the wider effects of car driving, 
such as air pollution and environmental degradation associated with road building, whereas 
the other worldviews (especially individualism) interpret the issue more narrowly in terms of 
road traffic accidents (this was also confirmed in the focus groups). 
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Table 7.2 therefore reveals a pattern of correlations between cultural biases and responses 
to the 'psychometric paradigm' questions which is consistent with the predictions of cultural 
theory, and provides some insights into the underlying meanings given to the risk 
characteristics in the context of each worldview.  These differences were further investigated 
in the focus groups. 
 
Finally, Table 7.3 shows correlations between cultural bias scores and answers to the 
question "when you think about risks in general, do you think [characteristic X] is 
important?".  Most of these correlations were very low and not significant, and no obvious 
pattern emerged.  It should be noted that virtually all respondents (94%) gave high scores 
(3, 4 or 5) to all the risk characteristics in response to this question.  This was probably due 
to the leading way in which the question was introduced, with the statement "you have just 
scored nine factors which some people say are important when thinking about risks.  I would 
like to know how important you feel each of these factors is.".  The only exception was 
'dread', where 23 respondents (18%) scored 1 or 2, and this was indeed the characteristic 
for which the highest correlation (0.34) with cultural bias (fatalism) was observed.  It is also 
perhaps worth noting that both individualism and hierarchy were correlated with the opinion 
that 'involuntariness' was an important factor when making decisions about risk. 
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8. Relationship Between Socio-demographic Variables and Risk Perceptions 
 
Do socio-demographic variables predict risk perceptions? 
 
8.1 Relationship between socio-demographic variables and 'general risk 
perceptions' 
Risk perceptions (defined in five different ways as Riskiness, Fatalities, Injuries, 
Environmental Harm and Unacceptability) were first analysed for all thirteen risk issues 
aggregated.  What was analysed was risk perception in a general sense, across a range of 
thirteen disparate issues. 
 
Sex: Women tended to rate risk higher than men (except when defined as Environmental 
Harm), and analysis of variance indicated that this difference was statistically significant at 
the 95% confidence level. 
Age: Older respondents tended to rate risk lower than younger people, but only when risk 
perception was defined as Fatalities, Injuries or Environmental Harm (see Table 8.1). 
Level of education: Respondents were divided into four categories: those with no 
educational qualifications at all, those with at least one 'O' level, those with at least one 'A' 
level, and those with a university degree.  Analyses of variance indicated that the only 
statistically significant difference (p=0.038) was between respondents with or without a 
university degree: those with a degree tended to rate the Riskiness scale lower across all 
risk issues. 
Household income: Respondents with higher household incomes tended to rate risk lower 
than those with lower incomes, on all the scales except Injuries (see Table 8.1). 
 
In summary, 'general risk perceptions' were related to socio-demographic variables 
(especially sex, age and income), but the correlations were not very high.  The highest was 
0.32, indicating that, at most, only 10% of the variation could be explained by any one 
variable. 
 
8.2 Relationship between socio-demographic variables and perceptions of single 
risk issues 
The previous section analysed risk perceptions aggregated for all thirteen risk issues (from 
sunbathing to alcoholic drinks).  In order to analyse the data at the level of individual risk 
issues, multiple regression analyses were carried out using all the socio-demographic 
variables together, and the results are summarised in Table 8.2. 
Some of the R2 values obtained were higher than those obtained for 'general' risk 
perceptions, but the correlations were still not very strong (the highest R2 value was 28%).  A 
large number of significant correlations were, however, obtained: 38 out of the 65 R2 values 
in Table 8.3 were significant at the 95% level (with R2 ≥ 6.0%).  This indicated that these 
correlations were unlikely to be due to random variation, and that there was a statistically 
significant (but weak) relationship between the socio-demographic attributes of respondents 
and the risk ratings they gave to individual risk issues.  In general, socio-demographic 
variables seemed to be more closely related to the Fatalities, Injuries and Environmental 
Harm scales than to the Riskiness and Unacceptability scales.  It is also interesting to note 
that it was the issues associated with 'social ills' such as mugging, terrorism, and alcoholic 
drinks which obtained the highest R2 values.  The only other issue with R2 values above 16% 
was accidents in the home. 
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9. Relationship Between Socio-demographic Variables and Risk Characteristics 
 
The socio-demographic attributes of respondents were compared to the mean of the scores 
(for the thirteen risk issues) they gave to each of the nine risk characteristics in turn.  Some 
weak relationships were revealed between some of the socio-demographic attributes of the 
respondents and their tendency to rate particular risk characteristics high or low.  The 
statistically significant relationships revealed (at the 95% level) were (see Table 9.1): 
 
• 'Delayed effects' was rated higher by women; and by respondents with lower 
incomes. 
•  'Severity' was rated higher by women; and by younger respondents. 
• 'Harm to future generations' was rated higher by women; and by respondents with 
lower incomes. 
•  'Catastrophic potential' was rated higher by younger respondents. 
• 'Lack of knowledge to those exposed' was rated higher by respondents with no 
formal educational qualifications. 
•  'Dread' was rated higher by respondents with lower incomes. 
•  'Unfairness' was rated higher by respondents with lower incomes. 
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10. Relationship Between Socio-demographic Variables and Cultural Biases 
 
The socio-demographic attributes of respondents were compared to the scores they 
obtained for each cultural bias. 
 
Sex:  Women tended to have higher egalitarian scores, and lower fatalist scores, than men, 
and analyses of variance indicated that these differences were statistically significant.  There 
was no statistically significant relationship with individualism or hierarchy. 
Age: Older respondents tended to have higher hierarchy and individualism scores than 
younger respondents, but there was no statistically significant relationship with fatalism or 
egalitarianism (see Table 10.1). 
Level of education: Analyses of variance revealed that there was a very strong relationship 
between the fatalism, hierarchy and individualism scores of respondents and their education 
level. Egalitarianism was less closely related to education level.  Furthermore, for 
egalitarianism, the relationship was in the opposite direction than for the other three cultural 
biases: respondents with higher levels of education tended to have higher egalitarian scores 
but lower fatalist, hierarchy and individualism scores. 
Household income: Respondents with lower incomes tended to have higher fatalism and 
hierarchy scores, but there was no statistically significant with egalitarianism or individualism 
(see Table 10.1). 
 
Multiple regression analyses were carried using all the socio-demographic variables 
together, and the results are summarised in Table 10.2.  The results indicated a statistically 
significant relationship with all four cultural biases, but the highest R2 value obtained (for 
fatalism) was only 23%.  The correlation between socio-demographic variables and 
egalitarianism was weaker than for the other three cultural biases.  In summary: 
 
•   Fatalists tended to be men, have less formal education, and lower incomes. 
• Hierarchists tended to be older, have less formal education, and lower incomes. 
•   Individualists tended to be older and have less formal education. 
• Egalitarians tended to be women and have higher educational qualifications. 
 
Results from this study (see Section 8) and previous studies have indicated that, although 
not very strong, there are some relationships between socio-demographic attributes and risk 
perceptions (reviewed in Marris et al., 1996; Rohrmann, 1995; Sjöberg and Drottz-Sjöberg, 
1994).  Some of the other results discussed in this paper, indicating relationships between 
cultural biases and risk perceptions, may therefore have been influenced by socio-
demographic attributes of the respondents as well as or instead of cultural biases. 
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11. Conclusions from Sample A: Does the 'Psychometric Paradigm' or Cultural 
Theory Provide the Best Framework for Explaining Risk Perceptions? 
 
Are risk perceptions best explained by the risk characteristics proposed by the 'psychometric 
paradigm', cultural biases, socio-demographic variables, or a combination of these factors?  
Does the 'psychometric paradigm' or cultural theory provide the best framework to 
understand risk perceptions? 
 
One recurrent criticism of cultural theory has been that, when using the quantitative 
methodology proposed by Dake, it has failed to explain much of the variation in risk 
perceptions between people.  Some researchers have argued that correlations obtained 
between cultural biases and risk perceptions are so low that the theory should be dismissed.  
Sjöberg (e.g. 1995) has been particularly vocal about this point, and concludes his Empirical 
Evaluation of Cultural Theory as follows:  "Cultural Theory dimensions added very little to the 
explanatory power of the psychometric scales of Fischhoff and Slovic.  It is concluded that 
Cultural Theory explains only a very minor share of the variance of perceived risk and that it 
adds even less to what is explained by different approaches." (Sjöberg, 1995, p. 1).  The 
results reported here are not significantly different to those described by Sjöberg, but we 
argue that they lend more support to the validity of cultural theory than Sjöberg suggests.   
 
Table 11.1 combines results given earlier in this paper and lists the percentage of variance 
in risk perceptions explained by each of the three types of variables analysed in this study, 
namely: risk characteristics, cultural biases, and socio-demographic variables.  Table 11.1 
refers only to risk perception defined as Riskiness, but results using the other four definitions 
of risk were very similar.  This table clearly shows that the risk characteristics proposed by 
Slovic et al. generated a greater number of statistically significant correlations, and that 
these were far higher than correlations obtained using either cultural biases or socio-
demographic variables.  Cultural biases could only explain 12%, at most, of the variation in 
risk perceptions, compared to 50%, at most, for the risk characteristics proposed by the 
'psychometric paradigm'.  Controlling for socio-demographic variables and then modelling 
risk characteristics and cultural biases against risk perceptions did not alter the results to 
any significant degree (this analysis is not reported here).  At first sight Table 11.1 therefore 
suggests that the 'psychometric paradigm' provides a much better explanation for risk 
perceptions than cultural theory. 
 
We argue, however, that the relative weakness of correlations with cultural biases is not 
surprising and does not necessarily invalidate the claims made by cultural theorists.  Risk 
characteristics such as 'dread' and 'severity' are so closely related to public interpretations of 
'risk' that they are practically indistinguishable from 'risk perception'.  The other risk 
characteristics of the 'psychometric paradigm' tap into other dimensions of risk, but all are 
extremely close to the original question "how much risk do you think is associated with X?".  
Cultural biases (and socio-demographic variables), in contrast, are far more distant 
variables.  None of the questionnaire items used in this study to measure cultural biases 
referred directly to views on risk, health, technology or the environment (see Table 6.1).  We 
therefore believe that even though the correlations between risk perceptions and cultural 
biases were low, they should not be dismissed.  As discussed in Section 6.2, the number of 
significant correlations obtained was high; and, moreover, the pattern of correlations 
obtained was consistent with the predictions of cultural theory.  Thus, it was comparisons 
between the four cultural biases, considered collectively, which provided the most interesting 
insights, rather than any single correlation examined in isolation from the others.  When 
analysed in this way, the results clearly demonstrated that the four worldviews generated 
distinct patterns of risk perceptions and these were consistent with our prior predictions 
based on cultural theory (compare Table 3.1 with Table 6.6). 
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In addition, cultural biases were also correlated with views about the trustworthiness of 
different institutions, and also views about Nature, industry and technology (see Tables 6.7 
and 6.8).  Some of these correlations were of the same order as those obtained for risk 
characteristics; and, interestingly, the highest correlations related to feelings of 
powerlessness in the face of change imposed by business and government.  These 
dimensions, we argue, point to important factors which are not captured using the 
'psychometric paradigm'. Risk perceptions are not just about abstract ratings of 'risk'.  
People use environmental and other threats as a focus to express their anxieties about the 
world around them, and in particular their inability to influence the way it is changing.  This 
was particularly apparent in the focus group discussions. 
 
We argue that the 'psychometric paradigm' methodology generates robust quantitative 
results, but does not provide much insight into the reasons why particular risk characteristics 
are closely correlated with risk perceptions.  Similarly, while some of the correlations 
obtained between socio-demographic variables and risk perceptions were interesting, they 
do not, in themselves, provide any explanation about why those relationships should exist.  
Cultural theory, on the other hand, does suggest an explanation for risk perceptions by 
showing how they fit coherently into worldviews held by respondents.   
 
Moreover, by combining the 'psychometric paradigm' and cultural theory data, we have been 
able to provide insights into the underlying meanings of the risk characteristics derived from 
the 'psychometric paradigm' (see Section 7).  Cultural theory and the 'psychometric 
paradigm' are therefore very different in nature and it would therefore be more appropriate to 
consider the two approaches as being complementary to each other rather than trying to 
judge their comparative value according to the strict quantitative criteria proposed by 
Sjöberg.  We believe that the two approaches measure importantly different dimensions of 
risk perceptions, and that careful use of both frameworks together provides more interesting 
insights into risk perceptions than either approach used on its own. 
 
We also believe that further development of the cultural biases questionnaire would 
undoubtedly increase the strength of correlations obtained between cultural biases and risk 
perceptions.  The cluster analysis performed on the cultural biases items used in our 
questionnaire suggested that they were measuring significant dimensions of worldviews, and 
results from the focus groups demonstrated that Dake's questionnaire could be used to 
identify 'extreme' individuals who held the four archetypal worldviews suggested by cultural 
theory (these results will be reported fully elsewhere).  Worldviews are, however, by 
definition multidimensional and therefore difficult to measure using a questionnaire 
instrument of the type used here.  It would be more appropriate, when trying to test cultural 
theory empirically, to ask questions which were less abstract and more embedded within a 
specific social context. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that all the results discussed so far refer only to Sample A, and 
used individuals as the unit of analysis.  As noted in Section 1, some cultural theorists argue 
that this is inappropriate and that the theory can and should only be applied at a collective 
level.  The results presented derived from Sample A and in Sections 4 to 11 fail, like Dake's 
original study, to investigate the first tenet of cultural theory, which is that adherence to a 
certain pattern of social relationships generates a distinctive way of viewing the world (see 
Section 1.2).  Thus, although cultural theory is supposed to be about social relations, the 
quantitative methodology developed by Dake (the abstract risk ratings and the cultural bias 
items) is psychometric in nature and focuses only on individual traits.  Interestingly, although 
the 'psychometric paradigm', in contrast to cultural theory, focuses on cognitive process of 
individuals rather then their social context, previous analysis has actually used mean scores 
and therefore produced results at a collective, rather than individual level.  As shown in 
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Section 5.3, different results were obtained when the same data was analysed using 
individual scores. 
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12. Results from Sample B 
 
12.1 Introduction 
In order to address some of these methodological problems discussed above in Section 11 
(see also Section 1), the research design for this study incorporated two additional features: 
 
1.  A functionalist element: 
A second sample, Sample B, was designed to investigate whether there was any association 
between cultural biases, measured using Dake's cultural biases questionnaire, and 
association with association with institutions with specific grid and group characteristics.  
This was intended to address the first tenet of cultural theory, that social relations and 
cultural biases are inextricably inter-linked.  The results are presented below, in Section 12. 
 
2.  A qualitative element: 
Participants from both Sample A and Sample B participated in a series of focus groups.  
Each focus group brought together people who, according to their responses to Dake's 
cultural biases questionnaire, held one of the four cultural biases (for Sample B, the 
participants were from the same institution).  The format of the focus groups enabled the 
participants to discuss the issues raised by the questionnaire survey in more depth, and in a 
far less abstract fashion. In particular, issues surrounding trust, accountability and fairness 
were further explored during the group discussions (the results from the focus groups will be 
published in full elsewhere). 
 
Sections 4 to 11 referred only to results from Sample A, which consisted of a cluster sample 
of Norwich residents.  This last section of the paper describes the results obtained from 
Sample B, which consisted of three sub-samples, with respondents selected according to 
their association with a particular institution with specific grid and group characteristics. 
 
The questions addressed in the analysis of data from Sample B were different to those for 
Sample A, namely: 
 
• Did association with these institutions correlate with cultural biases, as measured by 
Dake's questionnaire? (see Section 12.3) 
• Did association with these institutions correlate with risk perceptions, and in a way 
which fits the predictions of cultural theory? (see Section 12.4) 
• Did association with these institutions correlate with particular views on trust? (see 
Section 12.5) 
 
12.2 Sample B 
Sample B (N=70) was a purposive sample, which consisted of participants associated with 
specific local institutions.  Three distinct institutions were selected on the basis of their 
hypothesised grid and group characteristics: Scouts (hierarchist); The Greenhouse 
(egalitarian); and the Chamber of Commerce (individualist). 
 
The Scouts (N=23) sub-sample consisted of adults who worked (voluntarily) with the Scouts, 
organising and supervising activities for young people in Norwich.  They were recruited from 
several Norwich local divisions, via the District Commissioner. 
 
The Greenhouse (N=28) is a Norwich-based network of radical environ-mentalists who are 
engaged in a range of educational and campaigning activities about issues such as road 
building, nuclear power, AIDS, the veal trade and animal rights.  They also run a shop selling 
a range of 'fair-traded' and environmentally sustainable products, and are in the process of 
renovating an old building which will serve as a base for their activities.  The participants 
recruited were engaged in one or more activities associated with the Greenhouse (e.g. 
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assisting in the shop or with the building renovation, or using the facilities in the office for 
campaigning activities). 
 
The Chamber of Commerce (N=19) sub-sample consisted of individuals who were running 
(or planned to run) their own business.  They were recruited through their involvement with 
one of two organisations based at the Norwich and Norfolk Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry.  The first was the Norwich Enterprise Agency Trust, which provides advice, 
counselling and training for people wishing to set up their own business.  The second was 
the Prince's Youth Business Trust, which provides financial and other support to young 
unemployed people (18-29) to help them start their own business14. 
 
Socio-demographic profile of Sample B: 
Respondents for Sample B were selected according to their association with one of the three 
selected institutions, and no prior assumptions were made about any relationship between 
association with these institutions and socio-demographic characteristics.  Some effort was 
made to balance the number of men and women interviewed, and the percentage of men in 
the Greenhouse, Scouts and Chamber of Commerce sub-samples were, respectively, 56%, 
56% and 58%.  Each sub-sample covered a fairly broad range of household incomes, ages, 
and levels of education, but some differences were observed between them: 
 
• The Scouts and Chamber of Commerce sub-samples represented a range of 
household incomes (though not as great as the range for Sample A), but most of the 
Greenhouse sample were on low incomes (85% under £10,000 per annum).  This 
reflected the fact that most of the Greenhouse partici-pants were either unemployed, 
students, or retired. 
• The spread of ages in the Scouts and Chamber of Commerce sub-samples was 
broadly similar to that of Sample A (except that there were no participants over 60 
years of age); but the Greenhouse sub-sample tended to be younger, and, rather 
than consisting of an overall spread, consisted mostly of participants who were either 
under 29 or over 60. 
• The Greenhouse and Chamber of commerce sub-samples were much more highly 
educated than either the Scouts sub-sample or Sample A. 
 
Overall, the socio-demographic profiles of the Scouts and Chamber of Commerce sub-
samples were therefore fairly similar to that of Sample A, but the Greenhouse participants 
appeared to be more unusual, with very low incomes yet very high educational attainment.  
This reflected the fact that many of the partici-pants had voluntarily 'opted out' of 
conventional careers and were devoting much of their time, unpaid, to campaigning about 
environmental issues (but note that results from Sample A demonstrated that egalitarianism 
was the only cultural bias which correlated with higher levels education). 
 
Differences in risk perception and trust between the three sub-samples discussed in the next 
three sections may have been influenced by these differences in socio-demographic 
characteristics (instead of or in addition to cultural biases).  Results from Sample A indicated 
that, although not very strong, there were some relationships between socio-demographic 
characteristics and risk perceptions (see Section 8). 
 
 
12.3 Relationship between cultural biases and association with specific institutions 
                                                 
14
 The authors would like to take this opportunity to thank all the respondents for their 
participation in this study, and also to those within these institutions who very kindly and 
efficiently helped us recruit suitable participants.  Our special thanks go to: Hugh 
Fetherston (Scouts), Tigger (Greenhouse), Peter Smith (NEAT) and Anne Lavery (PYBT). 
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Table 12.1 lists the mean cultural bias scores obtained for each sub-sample; and Table 12.2 
reveals which variations in cultural bias scores between the sub-samples were statistically 
significant.  Table 12.3 lists the percentage of respondents which fell into particular cultural 
bias groups for each of sub-sample, using criteria C (the basis for these criteria was 
explained in Section 6.1.) 
The Greenhouse sample did, as hypothesised, have a relatively high mean score for 
egalitarianism and low mean scores for all three other cultural biases, compared to the other 
two sub-samples of Sample B and to Sample A.  Most, but not all, of these differences were 
statistically significant.  In particular, the fatalism scores of the Greenhouse sample was not 
statistically different from either Sample A or the Scouts and Chamber of Commerce sub-
samples.  The Greenhouse sub-sample was, however, clearly egalitarian: all of the 
Greenhouse respondents had an egalitarian score above that for Sample A, and for 43% of 
the Greenhouse respondents, the only score above the mean for Sample A was their 
egalitarian score.  Using criteria C, 23 respondents (85% of the Greenhouse sub-sample) 
were categorised as 'pure' egalitarians.  If the Greenhouse is accepted as an archetype for 
an egalitarian institution, these results indicated that the set of items utilised in this study 
were very effective in picking out an egalitarian worldview (see Tables 12.1, 12.2 and 12.3). 
 
The Scouts sub-sample, as expected, showed a clear tendency toward hierarchy  (see 
Tables 12.1, 12.2 and 12.3).  It had a higher mean score for hierarchy than Sample A and 
the Greenhouse and Chamber of Commerce sub-samples, and all of these differences were 
statistically significant.  The relationship between association with the Scouts and a 
hierarchical worldview was not, however, as clear-cut as the relationship between 
egalitarianism and association with the Greenhouse.  Thus, although 78% of the 
respondents had a hierarchy score above the mean for Sample A, only 5 respondents (22% 
of the Scouts sub-sample) could be categorised as 'pure' hierarchists.  This indicated that 
the Scouts were not an archetype for a hierarchical institution but may also reflect the fact 
that the set of questionnaire items used in this study were not very effective in picking out a 
hierarchical cultural bias (see Section 6.1 and Table 6.2). 
 
The Chamber of Commerce sample did not show any bias toward any particular worldview : 
all four mean scores were slightly below the mean for Sample A, and none of these 
differences were statistically significant (see Table 12.1).  The only statistically significant 
difference between the Chamber of Commerce sample and the others was that it had lower 
hierarchy scores than the Scouts sample (see Table 12.2).  This suggests that self-
employed people do not share a particular worldview and/or that association with the 
Chamber of Commerce was not a good criteria for selection of an individualist worldview.  
Several characteristics of this particular sample, were however, worth noting.  Because of 
the way in which the respondents were selected (see Section 12.2), the sample consisted of 
people who had only recently set up their own business.  Additional information gathered 
during the interviews suggested that the respondents fell into one of three broad categories: 
 
1. Those in their late forties or early fifties who had been made redundant due to 
economic recession, mostly from large hierarchical institutions (e.g. Anglian Water, 
Anglia Television, Police Force, Civil Service).  Although they were pleased to have 
started their own business (usually related to a previous hobby, sometimes to their 
previous occupation), they probably would never had done so if they had been able 
to keep their previous jobs. 
2. Those who were younger (under 30) and had never had any formal employment.  
They did not expect to be able to find suitable employment in the formal sector due to 
a lack of formal training and the current state of the job market.  Self-employment, for 
them, was a way to work in their field of interest and their business were mostly 
related to artistic skills (e.g. pet portraits, graphic design, sculpture). 
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3. Mothers who wished to find some occupation as their children were growing up and 
no longer took up so much of their time.  They had no wish or opportunity to enter the 
formal job market. 
 
In addition, most of the respondents were given financial incentives to set up their own 
business either through the state-funded "Enterprise 2000" scheme or the Prince's Youth 
Business Trust.  Thus, none of these respondents were truly committed self-employed 
people, who had chosen to set up their own business because that was the strategy which 
fitted in best with their worldview.  It is therefore perhaps not surprising that this sample did 
not have a strikingly high score for individualism.  It is possible that many of these 
respondents were in a period of transition from one cultural bias to another, in view of the 
major life-changes they were experiencing, but it is not possible to determine this from the 
questionnaire survey data (the proportion of respondents with mixed cultural biases or none 
at all was similar to that in Sample A, around 54%, which does not support this idea) 15. 
 
12.4 Relationship between risk perceptions and association with specific 
institutions 
Table 12.4 lists the mean risk perception ratings, for each of the five definitions of risk 
(Riskiness, Fatalities, Injuries, Harm and Unacceptability), obtained by each of the sub-
samples (Greenhouse, Scouts and Chamber of Commerce).  In order to determine whether 
any of the differences observed between the sub-samples were significant, Tukey's pairwise 
comparisons were made for all the possible pairs, using each of the five different definitions 
of risks.  Table 12.5 shows the results when risk was defined as Unacceptability.  This was 
the definition which revealed the most significant differences, but a few additional significant 
differences were obtained using the other definitions.  For the sake of simplicity, Table 12.6 
summarises these results across all five definitions of risk, i.e. it shows the strongest 
statistically significant difference in risk perceptions between each of the pairs of sub-
samples, obtained using any one of the definitions of risk (Riskiness, Fatalities, Injuries, 
Environmental Harm or Unacceptability). 
 
Significant differences between the Greenhouse and Scouts sub-samples were observed for 
nine out of the thirteen risk issues, and this indicated that these two samples, did, indeed, 
represent two distinctive worldviews in relation to risk.  Very few significant differences were, 
however, observed for the other two possible pairs (Greenhouse versus Chamber of 
Commerce; and Scouts versus Chamber of Commerce).  This was probably due to the fact, 
discussed above, that the Chamber of Commerce sub-sample was not particularly 
homogeneous and/or typical in its worldview. 
 
Differences in risk perceptions between the Greenhouse and Scouts sub-samples 
resembled those obtained from Sample A for egalitarian and hierarchist cultural biases, and 
were consistent with the predictions of cultural theory (see Section 6.2).  Thus, the 
Greenhouse sub-sample had significantly higher risk ratings than the Scouts sub-sample for 
environmental threats such as nuclear power and ozone depletion; and also for car driving.  
The Scouts respondents, on the other hand, tended to give higher risk ratings to accidents in 
the home and mugging.  As for Sample A, the relationship between perceptions of the risks 
associated with war and cultural biases was the opposite to what had been hypothesised: 
the Greenhouse sub-sample gave significantly higher ratings to war than the Scouts sample, 
and this relationship held for all the risk definitions except Unacceptability (where there was 
no significant difference).  As mentioned in Section 6.2, most respondents were focusing on 
the Balkans war when they responded to the questionnaire.  This war, and other wars 
happening 'far away', often in developing countries, are much more likely to be selected for 
                                                 
15
 Results from the Chamber of Commerce focus group did, however, suggest that these 
participants were, indeed, in a period of transition. 
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attention within a worldview which focuses on global issues, and on disadvantaged people.  
Thus it is not surprising that the Greenhouse participants, many of whom are involved in 
organisations such as Campaign Against the Arms Trade, selected war as a risk issue of 
high concern. 
 
12.5 Relationship between trust and association with specific institutions 
As discussed in Section 6.3, cultural biases were also expected to be expressed through 
views on trust.  Association with the Scouts, Greenhouse or Chamber of Commerce was 
therefore also expected to correlate with varying levels of trust in different institutions.   
 
Table 12.7 lists the mean trust scores given to ten different institutions by each of the three 
sub-samples, and Table 12.8 reveals which of the differences between the sub-samples 
were statistically significant.  Very few significant differences were observed when the 
Chamber of Commerce sub-sample was compared to either of the other two sub-samples 
(or to Sample A), further indicating that this sample did not reflect a particularly different or 
homogeneous worldview.   
 
When comparing the Greenhouse and Scouts sub-samples, however, a number of 
interesting differences were observed.  As expected, the Scouts had significantly higher 
levels of trust for companies, religious organisations, scientists, and doctors than the 
Greenhouse respondents.  Levels of trust in the Government were higher among the Scouts 
than the Greenhouse respondents, but the difference was not significant.  The Scouts 
respondents also trusted their friends and families more, and this reflects the correlation 
observed in Sample A between hierarchy and trust in friends and families.  The Greenhouse 
sample did, as expected, have a higher mean rating of trust for environmental organisations 
than the Scouts, but this difference was not statistically significant.  It is important to note, 
however, that these sub-samples were relatively small.  The percentage of Scouts and 
Chamber of Commerce respondents who trusted environmental organisations was fairly high 
(65% and 68% respectively), indicating perhaps that environmental organisations have 
gained more credibility among a wider public over the last decade.  Furthermore, the level of 
trust in environmental organisations among the Greenhouse respondents, although high 
(81%), was not much higher than that for Sample A (79%).  This rating was probably 
negatively affected by the perception among activists at the Greenhouse that many 
environmental organisations have become too institutionalised and should no longer be 
trusted (the Greenhouse was set up in part as a break away group from Greenpeace UK, 
because Greenpeace was felt to have lost touch with the grass-roots issues which these 
activists were most concerned about16). 
 
12.6 Conclusions from Sample B 
As discussed in Section 1.2, previous quantitative studies of cultural theory failed to 
investigate the relationship between cultural biases and social relationships, and therefore 
ignored the first tenet of cultural theory, which is that adherence to a certain pattern of social 
relationships generates a distinctive way of viewing the world.  In this study, respondents 
were recruited from three institutions selected according to their hypothesised grid and 
group characteristics, and the results demonstrated that participants from two of these (the 
Scouts and the Greenhouse) did, indeed, reflect distinct worldviews, and that, in both cases, 
the worldviews were consistent with the cultural bias which would, according to cultural 
theory, be associated with the specific grid and group characteristics of those two 
institutions.  Furthermore, these two sub-samples also generated distinct patterns of risk 
perceptions, and these were also consistent with the predicators of cultural theory (and with 
the results from Sample A). 
                                                 
16
 This ambiguity toward established environmental organisations was confirmed in the 
Greenhouse focus group. 
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Respondents from the third institution (the Chamber of Commerce) did not, however, hold a 
common worldview and this was probably due to weaknesses in the procedure used to 
select the participants for the study.  Further developments in methodologies to measure 
grid and group characteristics of institutions would be necessary to investigate this aspect of 
cultural theory more satisfactorily. 
43 
 
 
Tables 
 
Table 3.1: Hypothesised relationship between cultural biases and risk perceptions 
 
Risk Issue Individualism Heirarchy Egalitarianism 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War 
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Notes: 
Asterisks indicate a positive relationship between the risk issue and risk perception. For 
example, high levels of concern about genetic engineering were expected from an 
egalitarian worldview. Squares indicate a negative relationship between the risk issue and 
risk perception. For example, low levels of concern about genetic engineering were 
expected from an individualist worldview.  
 
Cells left blank indicate that no relationship was expected, or that the relationship was not 
easily predictable from cultural theory.  
 
No predictions were made for fatalism because cultural theorists have made few statements 
about the relationship between fatalism and risk perception. 
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Table 3.2: The nine characteristics selected for this study 
 
Involuntariness 
Do you think people are exposed to X voluntarily or involuntarily? (risk assumed voluntarily / 
risk assumed involuntarily) 
 
Delayed effects 
Do you think the harmful effects of X are likely to occur at some later time? (no effect 
delayed / many effects delayed) 
 
Severity 
Do you think people will die from X when things go wrong? (certain not to be fatal / certain to 
be fatal) 
 
Dread 
Are the risks of X ones that you can think about reasonably calmly, or are they ones that you 
have a great dread for – on the level of gut reaction? (think about calmly / think about with 
dread) 
 
Catastrophic potential 
Do you think X can harm a large number of people at once or only one person at a time (one 
person at a time / many people at once) 
 
Harm to future generations 
Do you think X poses risks to future generations? (very little threat / very great threat) 
 
Lack of knowledge to those exposed 
Do you think the risks associated with X are well known by the persons who are exposed to 
the risk? (risk well known / risk not known) 
 
Lack of knowledge to scientists 
Do you think the risks associated with X are well known by scientists? (risk well known / risk 
not known) 
 
Unfairness 
Do you think that the people who are exposed to the risks of X are the same as those who 
receive the benefits? (same people / not same people)  
 
Notes: 
This table lists the characteristics used in the questionnaire, the exact questions asked to 
the respondents for each of the thirteen risk issues (X); and the definitions of the end-points 
of the 5-point scales. These descriptions of the risk characteristics proposed by the 
‘psychometric paradigm’ were adapted from Slovic et al. (1985), but are not identical to 
those original ones.  
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Table 4.1: Mean risk perception scores for each risk issue from Sample A, with 
‘risk’ defined in five different ways 
 
 
Risk issues Riskiness Fatalities Injuries Environmental 
Harm 
Unacceptability 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War 
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
4.1 
4.0 
3.9 
3.7 
3.6 
3.5 
3.4 
3.4 
3.3 
3.2 
3.0 
2.8 
2.0 
 
2.4 
2.0 
2.1 
1.8 
3.7 
3.7 
3.1 
2.5 
2.7 
2.58 
3.0 
1.3 
1.2 
 
2.7 
2.3 
3.0 
1.9 
3.7 
3.9 
3.2 
3.0 
2.9 
3.4 
3.4 
1.8 
1.4 
 
3.3 
3.4 
1.6 
2.5 
3.7 
3.4 
1.8 
1.8 
2.6 
1.7 
1.7 
1.5 
1.4 
 
3.6 
4.0 
2.9 
3.3 
4.3 
3.5 
3.8 
4.0 
4.1 
3.2 
3.0 
2.5 
1.9 
 
 
Notes: 
Scores shown in normal type indicate risk ratings which were virtually universal, i.e. less 
than 15% of respondents gave a rating at one or other end of the 5-point scale (1 and 2; or 4 
and 5). Scores shown in bold italics indicate scores for which there was more variability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
 
Table 4.2: Ordered mean risk perception scores for each risk issue from Sample A, with ‘risk’ defined in five different ways 
 
 
Riskiness Fatalities Injuries Env. Harm Unacceptability 
 
Nuclear power 
Ozone depletion 
Sunbathing 
Genetic eng. 
War 
Car driving 
Mugging 
AIDS 
Terrorism 
Home accidents 
Alcohol 
Food colourings 
Microwave ovens 
 
4.1 
4.0 
3.9 
3.7 
3.6 
3.5 
3.4 
3.4 
3.3 
3.2 
3.0 
2.8 
2.0 
 
Car driving 
War 
AIDS 
Alcohol 
Home accidents 
Terrorism 
Mugging 
Nuclear power 
Sunbathing 
Ozone depletion 
Genetic eng. 
Food colourings 
Microwave ovens 
 
3.7 
3.7 
3.1 
3.0 
2.8 
2.7 
2.5 
2.4 
2.1 
2.0 
1.8 
1.3 
1.2 
 
Car driving 
War 
Home accidents 
Alcohol 
AIDS 
Mugging 
Sunbathing 
Terrorism 
Nuclear power 
Ozone depletion 
Genetic eng. 
Food colourings 
Microwave ovens 
 
3.9 
3.7 
3.4 
3.4 
3.2 
3.0 
3.0 
2.9 
2.7 
2.3 
1.9 
1.8 
1.4 
 
War 
Car driving 
Ozone depletion 
Nuclear power 
Terrorism 
Genetic eng. 
Alcohol 
AIDS 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Microwave ovens 
 
3.7 
3.4 
3.4 
3.3 
2.6 
2.5 
1.9 
1.8 
1.8 
1.7 
1.6 
1.5 
1.4 
 
War 
Terrorism 
Ozone depletion 
Mugging 
AIDS 
Nuclear power 
Car driving 
Genetic eng. 
Home accidents 
Alcohol 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Microwave ovens 
 
4.3 
4.1 
4.0 
4.0 
3.8 
3.6 
3.5 
3.3 
3.2 
3.0 
2.9 
2.5 
1.9 
 
 
Notes: 
This table represents exactly the same data as Table 4.2, but in this case the mean risk perception scores are listed in decreasing order in 
each column. 
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Table 4.3: Correlations between the five different definitions of ‘risk’ 
 
 Riskiness Fatalities Injuries Unacceptability 
 
Fatalities 
Injuries 
Unacceptability 
Environmental Harm 
 
0.33 
0.38 
  0.69** 
 0.63* 
 
- 
  0.96** 
 0.64* 
0.50 
 
  0.96** 
- 
 0.58* 
0.38 
 
0.64* 
0.58* 
- 
0.67* 
 
 
Notes: 
 
This table lists correlations between: 
1. the mean risk perception scores obtained for each of the thirteen risk issues for 
one particular definition of ‘risk’; and 
2. the mean risk perception scores obtained for the same thirteen risk issues using 
a different definition of ‘risk’. 
 
For example, the first cell in the table shows the correlation between mean ratings obtained 
for each of the thirteen issues on the Riskiness scale with mean ratings obtained for those 
same risk issues on the Fatalities scale. This particular correlation (0.33) was low and was 
not significant at the 95% confidence level, indicating that these two scales seemed to be 
measuring different dimensions of ‘riskiness’. In contrast, the correlation between Fatalities 
and Injuries was very high (0.96) indicating (unsurprisingly) that these two scales were very 
closely related. 
 
Throughout this paper, asterisks indicate the level of statistical significance of correlations: 
 * = p < 0.05  ** = p < 0.01  *** = p < 0.001 
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Table 5.1: Factor analysis of the nine risk characteristics 
 
 
Risk characteristic Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Communality 
 
Delayed effects 
Harm to future generations 
Catastrophic potential 
Involuntariness 
Unfairness 
Lack of knowledge to scientists 
Lack of knowledge to exposed 
Severity 
Dread 
 
Variance 
% Variance 
 
0.91 
0.89 
0.83 
0.30 
0.26 
-0.30 
-0.02 
0.50 
0.53 
 
3.10 
0.34 
 
-0.15 
0.33 
0.21 
0.89 
0.89 
0.88 
0.07 
0.23 
0.60 
 
2.97 
0.33 
 
-0.03 
-0.31 
-0.20 
-0.13 
-0.22 
0.19 
0.96 
-0.83 
-0.60 
 
2.20 
0.24 
 
0.86 
1.00 
0.78 
0.90 
0.91 
0.91 
0.92 
0.99 
1.00 
 
8.27 
0.92 
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Table 5.2: Correlations between the nine risk characteristics 
 
 
 Future 
generations 
Dread Catastrophic Severity Involuntariness Unfairness Lack 
knowledge by 
scientists 
Lack 
knowledge by 
exposed 
 
Delayed effects 
Future generations 
Dread 
Catastrophic 
Severity 
Involuntariness 
Unfairness 
Lack knowledge scientists 
Lack knowledge exposed 
 
   0.78** 
 - 
   0.85** 
    0.88*** 
   0.78** 
  0.61* 
  0.60* 
-0.03 
-0.29 
 
   0.80** 
    0.85*** 
 - 
   0.69** 
    0.90*** 
   0.77** 
   0.80** 
 0.26 
-0.54 
 
   0.72** 
    0.88*** 
   0.69** 
 - 
  0.62* 
 0.55 
 0.50 
-0.18 
-0.23 
 
 0.45 
   0.78** 
    0.90*** 
  0.62* 
 - 
 0.47 
 0.52 
-0.10 
  -0.78** 
 
 0.16 
  0.61* 
   0.77** 
 0.55 
 0.47 
 - 
    0.96*** 
  0.64* 
-0.08 
 
0.14 
 0.60* 
  0.80** 
0.50 
0.52 
    0.96*** 
 - 
  0.67* 
-0.18 
 
-0.43 
-0.03 
 0.26 
-0.18 
-0.10 
  0.64* 
  0.67* 
 - 
0.27 
 
-0.05 
-0.29 
-0.54 
-0.23 
  -0.78** 
-0.08 
-0.18 
 0.27 
 - 
 
 
Notes: 
 
This table lists correlations between: 
1. the mean scores obtained for each of the thirteen risk issues for one specific risk characteristic; and 
2. the mean scores obtained for the same thirteen risk issues for a second risk characteristic.  
 
For example, the correlation between mean scores for ‘unfairness’ and for ‘involuntariness’ was very high (0.96) indicating that, on average, 
risk issues which were felt to be involuntary were also felt to be unfair.  
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Table 5.3: Correlations between ‘lack of knowledge to those exposed’ and other 
characteristics: comparison with Slovic et al. (1980) 
 
 
 Our results Slovic’s results 
 
Severity 
Dread 
Harm to future generations 
Lack of knowledge to science 
Catastrophic potential 
Unfairness 
Involuntariness 
Delayed effects 
 
-0.78 
-0.54 
-0.29 
0.27 
-0.23 
-0.18 
-0.07 
-0.05 
 
-0.12 
0.05 
0.35 
0.50 
0.24 
0.28 
0.63 
0.77 
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Table 5.4: Mean scores obtained for each of the nine risk characteristics on each of the thirteen issues 
 
 
 Lack know. 
exp. 
Unfairness Dread Future 
generations 
Catastrophi
c potential 
Delayed 
effects 
Involuntarines
s 
Severity Lack know. 
sci. 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War 
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
2.5 
3.7 
3.7 
2.8 
2.2 
2.6 
3.3 
2.2 
3.6 
2.0 
1.9 
2.2 
2.4 
 
1.8 
3.1 
3.7 
3.9 
4.6 
2.7 
3.8 
3.0 
2.1 
2.8 
4.4 
4.3 
2.3 
 
1.9 
1.5 
2.8 
3.6 
3.3 
2.2 
3.2 
2.9 
1.4 
3.4 
3.9 
3.6 
2.0 
 
2.7 
2.2 
3.6 
4.3 
2.6 
1.9 
4.4 
3.3 
1.5 
4.0 
4.2 
3.6 
2.5 
 
3.4 
2.8 
3.1 
4.6 
1.9 
1.9 
4.4 
3.3 
1.4 
3.1 
4.8 
4.2 
2.3 
 
4.3 
3.2 
4.0 
4.4 
2.9 
2.3 
4.5 
3.1 
2.4 
4.2 
3.8 
3.3 
3.7 
 
1.7 
3.4 
3.6 
4.5 
4.5 
3.0 
4.3 
2.9 
1.9 
2.9 
4.3 
4.5 
1.6 
 
3.3 
2.2 
3.3 
4.5 
3.9 
3.3 
3.6 
4.1 
2.2 
4.7 
4.6 
4.4 
3.6 
 
1.3 
1.8 
2.1 
1.7 
2.3 
1.9 
1.9 
1.8 
1.9 
1.5 
1.8 
2.0 
1.5 
 
 
Notes: 
 
Scores shown in normal type indicate ratings for which there was a virtual consensus among the respondents, i.e. where less than 15% of the 
respondents gave a rating at one or other end of the 5-point scale (1 and 2; or 4 and 5). Scores shown in bold italics indicate scores for which 
there was more variability.  
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Table 5.5: Correlations between risk perceptions and the nine risk characteristics using mean scores 
 
 
 Riskiness Environmental Harm Unacceptability Fatalities Injuries 
 
Delayed effects 
Harm to future generations 
Catastrophic potential 
Involuntariness 
Unfairness  
Lack knowledge to exposed  
Severity 
Dread 
Lack knowledge scientists 
Factor 1 
Factor 2 
Factor 3 
 
   0.74** 
   0.76** 
   0.73** 
 0.49 
 0.45 
-0.26 
  0.62* 
  0.64* 
-0.07 
   0.69** 
 0.19 
-0.26 
 
 0.44 
   0.80** 
    0.82*** 
  0.59* 
  0.59* 
-0.23 
  0.61* 
   0.72** 
 0.14 
  0.67* 
 0.40 
-0.22    
 
 0.41 
   0.80** 
  0.66* 
   0.74** 
   0.78** 
 -0.60* 
    0.87*** 
    0.95*** 
 0.23 
 0.49 
 0.55 
-0.60* 
 
 0.07 
 0.42 
 0.34 
 0.14 
 0.24 
   -0.89*** 
   0.80** 
  0.60* 
-0.18 
 0.18 
-0.02 
   -0.85***  
 
 0.06 
 0.30 
 0.27 
 0.05 
 0.14 
   -0.91*** 
   0.72** 
 0.48 
-0.27 
 0.09 
-0.13 
   -0.85*** 
 
 
Notes: 
 
This table lists correlations between: 
1. the mean risk perception scores for each of the thirteen risk-issues (with risk defined in five different ways); and 
2. the mean scores obtained for the same thirteen risk issues on each of the risk characteristics.  
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Table 5.6: Correlations between risk perceptions and the nine characteristics using individual scores 
 
Table 5.6.1: Riskiness 
 
 Future 
generations 
Severity Dread Delayed 
effects 
Catastrophic 
potential 
In-
voluntariness 
Unfairness Lack know. 
of scientists 
Lack know. 
of exposed 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War 
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
 0.38 
0.58 
0.47 
0.54 
0.37 
0.30 
0.31 
0.30 
0.27 
0.36 
0.27 
0.46 
0.30 
 
0.44 
0.37 
0.31 
0.40 
0.36 
0.31 
0.28 
0.36 
0.29 
0.20 
0.18 
0.22 
0.30  
 
0.29 
0.45 
0.44 
0.42 
0.48 
0.34 
0.38 
0.41 
0.51 
0.37 
0.14 
0.41 
0.32 
 
0.30 
0.23 
0.38 
0.40 
0.30 
0.13 
0.27 
0.23 
0.37 
0.26 
0.16 
0.24 
0.12 
 
0.13 
0.28 
0.20 
0.30 
0.14 
0.20 
0.07 
0.23 
0.29 
0.15 
0.18 
0.24 
0.25 
 
-0.07 
0.08 
0.21 
0.19 
0.27 
0.03 
0.01 
0.13 
0.25 
0.03 
0.11 
0.16 
0.10 
 
0.06 
0.00 
-0.02 
0.14 
-0.19 
0.18 
0.10 
-0.11 
0.11 
-0.04 
0.14 
0.03 
0.02 
 
-0.06 
0.06 
-0.20 
-0.01 
0.14 
0.09 
-0.23 
0.13 
-0.07 
-0.06 
0.08 
-0.01 
0.14 
 
0.07 
-0.10 
0.13 
0.13 
0.14 
0.07 
-0.13 
0.07 
0.00 
-0.01 
-0.04 
-0.15 
0.05 
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Table 5.6.2: Fatalities 
 
 Future 
generations 
Severity Dread Delayed 
effects 
Catastrophic 
potential 
In-
voluntariness 
Unfairness Lack know. 
of scientists 
Lack know. 
of exposed 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War 
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
 0.45 
0.23 
0.15 
0.34 
0.45 
0.32 
0.31 
0.38 
0.38 
0.44 
0.28 
0.42 
0.32 
 
0.36 
0.28 
0.37 
0.35 
0.27 
0.29 
0.29 
0.37 
0.31 
0.29 
0.18 
0.25 
0.35  
 
0.36 
0.24 
0.26 
0.32 
0.44 
0.25 
0.27 
0.27 
0.41 
0.24 
0.21 
0.30 
0.19 
 
0.14 
0.10 
0.15 
0.35 
0.52 
0.19 
0.14 
0.26 
0.28 
0.26 
0.31 
0.35 
0.24 
 
0.00 
0.01 
0.18 
0.20 
0.27 
0.13 
0.16 
0.28 
0.48 
0.28 
0.24 
0.31 
0.20 
 
0.08 
-0.15 
0.22 
0.17 
0.16 
0.08 
0.01 
0.10 
0.18 
-0.06 
0.11 
0.07 
-0.04 
 
0.17 
0.02 
0.02 
0.21 
-0.34 
0.04 
-0.03 
-0.16 
0.17 
0.04 
-0.08 
-0.05 
0.00 
 
0.05 
-0.18 
-0.17 
0.19 
0.08 
0.06 
-0.17 
0.11 
-0.07 
-0.03 
0.12 
0.04 
0.06 
 
0.04 
0.00 
-0.15 
0.11 
0.11 
0.09 
0.00 
-0.07 
-0.03 
-0.15 
0.00 
-0.06 
-0.13 
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Table 5.6.3: Injuries 
 
 Future 
generations 
Severity Dread Delayed 
effects 
Catastrophic 
potential 
In-
voluntariness 
Unfairness Lack know. 
of scientists 
Lack know. 
of exposed 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War 
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
0.29 
0.41 
0.23 
0.35 
0.39 
0.31 
0.38 
0.34 
0.35 
0.38 
0.30 
0.47 
0.22  
 
 0.29 
0.35 
0.44 
0.36 
0.32 
0.28 
0.39 
0.35 
0.41 
0.30 
0.19 
0.27 
0.37 
 
0.20 
0.43 
0.20 
0.26 
0.42 
0.12 
0.27 
0.23 
0.46 
0.20 
0.23 
0.33 
0.15 
 
0.14 
0.31 
0.08 
0.36 
0.45 
0.06 
0.25 
0.21 
0.25 
0.24 
0.40 
0.36 
0.25 
 
0.16 
0.32 
0.20 
0.26 
0.32 
0.18 
0.22 
0.31 
0.32 
0.26 
0.25 
0.34 
0.25 
 
-0.04 
0.16 
0.12 
0.27 
0.25 
0.06 
0.01 
0.09 
0.22 
0.06 
0.08 
0.11 
-0.14 
 
0.09 
0.07 
0.00 
0.13 
-0.29 
0.05 
-0.02 
-0.20 
0.22 
0.03 
-0.04 
-0.03 
-0.02 
 
-0.05 
0.05 
-0.07 
0.12 
-0.09 
0.02 
-0.04 
0.09 
-0.02 
0.03 
0.12 
0.08 
0.01 
 
0.09 
-0.12 
-0.19 
0.05 
0.10 
0.04 
0.00 
-0.04 
-0.05 
-0.14 
0.04 
-0.05 
-0.08 
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Table 5.6.4: Environmental Harm 
 
 Future 
generations 
Severity Dread Delayed 
effects 
Catastrophic 
potential 
In-
voluntariness 
Unfairness Lack know. 
of scientists 
Lack know. 
of exposed 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War 
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
 0.27 
0.37 
0.44 
0.37 
0.50 
0.24 
0.51 
0.42 
0.51 
0.19 
0.26 
0.41 
0.20 
 
0.12 
0.15 
0.28 
0.37 
0.15 
0.10 
0.50 
0.35 
0.50 
-0.02 
0.19 
0.29 
0.18  
 
0.19 
0.35 
0.23 
0.16 
0.38 
0.30 
0.53 
0.21 
0.46 
0.08 
0.06 
0.20 
0.24 
 
0.08 
0.21 
0.30 
0.39 
0.32 
0.21 
0.37 
0.36 
0.32 
0.17 
0.28 
0.32 
-0.09 
 
0.10 
0.24 
0.37 
0.18 
0.37 
0.32 
0.49 
0.36 
0.60 
0.33 
0.23 
0.36 
0.27 
 
-0.05 
0.17 
0.23 
0.40 
0.10 
0.13 
0.12 
0.18 
0.25 
0.08 
0.07 
0.05 
0.16 
 
0.22 
0.03 
0.04 
0.24 
-0.44 
0.05 
0.13 
0.05 
0.20 
0.05 
-0.07 
-0.13 
0.25 
 
-0.20 
-0.03 
0.10 
0.03 
0.08 
-0.13 
-0.08 
0.16 
-0.02 
0.13 
0.13 
0.11 
0.10 
 
0.13 
-0.09 
-0.10 
0.14 
0.08 
0.18 
0.00 
-0.05 
0.02 
0.08 
-0.06 
0.01 
0.20 
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Table 5.6.5: Unacceptability 
 Future 
generations 
Severity Dread Delayed 
effects 
Catastrophic 
potential 
In-
voluntariness 
Unfairness Lack know. 
of scientists 
Lack know. 
of exposed 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War 
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
0.42 
0.46 
0.51 
0.51 
0.28 
0.29 
0.62 
0.30 
0.40 
0.43 
0.29 
0.32 
0.45  
 
0.45 
0.45 
0.34 
0.42 
0.41 
0.27 
0.53 
0.34 
0.41 
0.30 
0.27 
0.37 
0.38  
 
0.44 
0.31 
0.51 
0.48 
0.44 
0.33 
0.58 
0.41 
0.50 
0.37 
0.17 
0.24 
0.35 
 
0.33 
0.44 
0.44 
0.48 
0.24 
0.04 
0.52 
0.19 
0.50 
0.40 
0.18 
0.24 
0.25 
 
0.16 
0.24 
0.30 
0.32 
0.06 
0.23 
0.52 
0.21 
0.40 
0.25 
0.34 
0.37 
0.27 
 
0.03 
0.23 
0.41 
0.28 
0.50 
0.23 
0.24 
0.14 
0.27 
0.10 
0.18 
0.29 
0.09 
 
0.14 
0.09 
0.21 
0.19 
0.04 
0.09 
0.02 
0.07 
0.20 
0.02 
0.14 
0.23 
0.07 
 
0.03 
0.11 
-0.08 
0.06 
-0.13 
-0.14 
-0.10 
0.12 
0.12 
-0.09 
0.06 
-0.05 
0.04 
 
0.06 
-0.02 
0.14 
0.16 
0.00 
0.09 
-0.01 
0.00 
0.13 
-0.15 
0.08 
-0.16 
-0.01 
 
Notes (for Tables 5.6.1 to 5.6.5): 
These tables list correlations between: 
1. the risk perception scores given to a particular risk-issue by each of the 131 respondents; and 
2. the scores given by those same respondents to that particular risk-issue for each risk characteristic in turn. 
 
For example, the first cell of Table 5.6.1 shows the correlation between the Riskiness scores given to sunbathing by each of the 131 respondents and the 
scores those same respondents gave to the ‘harm to future generations’ caused by sunbathing. In this particular case, the correlation was 0.38, and was 
significant at the 99.9% level. This indicated that, if a respondent thought that sunbathing would harm future generations they also tended to feel it was very 
‘risky’.  
 
See Figure 5.3 for a graphical illustration of the difference between the correlations listed in Table 5.4 and 5.5. 
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Correlations shown in bold italics were significant at the 95% confidence level (p < 0.05). Correlations above 0.144 were significant at the 95% confidence 
level; correlations above 0.201 were significant at the 97.5% confidence level; and the correlations above 0.268 were significant at the 99% confidence level. 
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Table 5.7: Percentage of variance in individual risk perceptions explained by the 
nine risk characteristics together 
 
 Riskiness Fatalities Unacceptability 
 
Food colourings 
Nuclear power 
Genetic engineering 
Mugging 
Microwave ovens 
Car driving 
Sunbathing 
Terrorism 
Ozone depletion 
Accidents in the home 
AIDS 
Alcoholic drinks 
War 
 
41*** 
34*** 
32*** 
31*** 
27*** 
26*** 
25*** 
22*** 
21*** 
17*** 
15** 
14** 
6 
 
15** 
26*** 
15** 
40*** 
26*** 
23*** 
26*** 
19*** 
11** 
13** 
17*** 
14** 
13** 
 
29*** 
42*** 
36*** 
35*** 
35*** 
19*** 
34*** 
23*** 
50*** 
21*** 
27*** 
25*** 
13** 
 
 
Notes: 
 
This table lists the adjusted multiple R2 values obtained from regression analyses of risk 
perceptions using all nine psychometric characteristics as independent variables (i.e. 
‘involuntariness’, ‘delayed effects’, ‘severity’, ‘dread’, ‘catastrophic potential’, ‘harm to future 
generations’, ‘lack of knowledge to those exposed’, ‘lack of knowledge to scientists’, and 
‘unfairness’). Asterisks indicate the level of significance of the correlations obtained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.1: Cultural bias items used in the questionnaire 
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Hierarchy (15 items) 
I think there should be more discipline in the youth of today. 
I would support the introduction of compulsory National Service. 
I am  more strict than most people about what is right and wrong. 
We should have stronger armed forces than we do now. 
The police should have the right to listen to private phone calls when investigating crime. 
Those in power often withhold information about things which are harmful to us. 
One of the problems with people is that they challenge authority too often. 
It is important to preserve our customs and heritage. 
I think it is important to carry on family traditions. 
In my household, family members have their own places at the dinner table. 
I always sort out clothes into separate categories before washing. 
I value regular routines highly. 
I think being on time is important. 
My time-tabling of meals is haphazard. (score reversed) 
I like to plan carefully so that financial risks are not taken. 
 
Individualism (9 items) 
In a fair system people with more ability should earn more. 
A free society can only exist by giving companies the opportunity to prosper. 
If a person has the get-up-and-go to acquire wealth, that person should have the right to 
enjoy it. 
It is just as well that life tends to sort out those who try harder from those who don’t. 
Continued economic growth is the answer to improved quality of life. 
This country would be better off if we didn’t worry so much about how equal people are. 
Making money is the main reason for hard work. 
I don’t join clubs of any kind. (score reversed) 
I tend to be sceptical of health food fads.  
 
Egalitarianism (11 items) 
If people in this country were treated more equally we would have fewer problems. 
The government should make sure everyone has a good standard of living. 
Those who get ahead should be taxed more to support the less fortunate. 
I would support a tax change that made people with large incomes pay more. 
The world could be a more peaceful place if its wealth were divided more equally among 
nations. 
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Social Security tends to stop people from trying harder to get on. (score reversed) 
Racial discrimination is a very serious problem in our society. 
What this country needs is a “fairness revolution” to make the distribution of goods more 
equal. 
Most of the meals I eat are vegetarian. 
Health requirements are very important in my choice of foods. 
I prefer simple and unprocessed foods. 
 
Fatalism (11 items) 
There is no use in doing things for people – you only get it in the neck in the long run. 
Cooperating with others rarely works. 
The future is too uncertain for a person to make serious plans. 
I have often been treated unfairly. 
A person is better off if he or she doesn’t trust anyone. 
I don’t worry about politics because I can’t influence things very much.  
Most people make friends only because friends are useful to them. 
I feel that life is like a lottery. 
Even if you work hard, you never know if that will help you do better.  
It seems to me that, whoever you vote for, things go on pretty much the same. 
I have few financial investments.  
 
(total: 46 items)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.2: Correlations between the four cultural bias scales 
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Table 6.2.1: Correlations between cultural bias scales using all the cultural bias 
items from our questionnaire (but excluding the ‘behavioural strategy’ 
items) 
 
 Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism 
 
Hierarchy 
Egalitarianism 
Fatalism 
 
0.65*** 
-0.45*** 
0.38*** 
 
 
-0.37*** 
0.28** 
 
 
 
-0.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.2.2: Correlations between cultural bias scales reported by Dake (1991) 
 
 Individualism Hierarchy 
 
Hierarchy 
Egalitarianism 
 
0.54*** 
-0.30*** 
 
 
-0.28*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.2.3: Correlations between cultural bias scales using the ‘UEA set’ of items 
 
 Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism 
 
Hierarchy 
Egalitarianism 
Fatalism 
 
0.53*** 
-0.42*** 
0.25** 
 
 
-0.16 
0.21 
 
 
 
0.07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.3: The ‘UEA set’ of cultural bias items used for the analysis of the data 
 
 
Statement Bias 
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CB1 
CB2 
CB3 
CB4 
 
CB5 
CB6 
CB7 
CB8 
CB9 
CB10 
 
CB11 
CB12 
CB13 
 
CB14 
CB15 
CB16 
CB17 
CB18 
CB19 
CB20 
CB21 
CB22 
CB23 
CB24 
CB25 
CB26 
CB27 
CB28 
 
CB29 
CB30 
 
CB31 
CB32 
CB33 
BS1 
 
Those who get ahead should be taxed more to support the less fortunate. 
Continued economic growth is the answer to improved quality of life. 
Cooperating with others rarely works. 
The police should have the right to listen to private phone calls when investigating 
crime. 
If people in this country were treated more equally we would have fewer problems. 
I have often been treated unfairly. 
It is just as well that life tends to sort out those who try harder from those who don’t. 
I don’t worry about politics because I can’t influence things very much. 
In a fair system people with more ability should earn more. 
If a person has the get-up-and-go to acquire wealth, that person should have the right 
to enjoy it. 
We should have stronger armed forces than we do now. 
Racial discrimination is a very serious problem in our society. 
Those in power often withhold information about things which are harmful to us. (score 
reversed) 
The future is too uncertain for a person to make serious plans. 
I would support the introduction of compulsory National Service. 
A person is better off if he or she doesn’t trust anyone. 
It is important to preserve our customs and heritage. 
I would support a tax change that made people with large incomes pay more. 
I think there should be more discipline in the youth of today. 
There is no use doing things for people – you only get it in the neck in the long run. 
Making money is the main reason for hard work. 
The government should make sure everyone has a good standard of living. 
One of the problems with people is that they challenge authority too often. 
It seems to me that, whoever you vote for, things pretty much go on the same. 
I feel like life is like a lottery. 
This country would be better off if we didn’t worry so much about how equal people 
are.  
A free society can only exist by giving companies the opportunity to prosper. 
The world could be a more peaceful place if its wealth were divided more equally 
amongst its nations. 
I am more strict than most people about what is right and wrong. 
What this country needs is a ‘fairness revolution’ to make the distribution of goods 
more equal. 
Most people only make friends because friends are useful to them. 
Social Security tends to stop people from trying harder to get on. (score reversed) 
Even if you work hard you never know if that will help you do better.  
 
E 
I 
F 
H 
 
E 
F 
I 
F 
I 
I 
 
H 
E 
H 
 
F 
H 
F 
H 
E 
H 
F 
I 
E 
H 
F 
F 
I 
I 
E 
 
H 
E 
 
F 
E 
F 
H 
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BS2 
BS3 
BS4 
BS5 
BS6 
BS7 
BS8 
BS9 
BS10 
BS11 
BS12 
BS13 
I think it is important to carry on family traditions. 
In my household, family members always sit at the same place at the dinner table. 
I always sort out clothes into separate categories before washing. 
I value regular routines highly. 
I think being on time is important.  
My time-tabling of meals is haphazard. (score reversed) 
I don’t join clubs of any kind. 
I tend to be sceptical of health food fads.  
Most of the meals I eat are vegetarian. 
Health requirements are very important in my choice of foods. 
I prefer simple and unprocessed foods. 
I like to plan carefully so that financial risks are not taken. 
I have few financial investments. 
H 
H 
H 
H 
H 
I 
I 
E 
E 
E 
H 
F 
 
 
Notes: 
 
Items which are struck-through were included in the questionnaire, but, following cluster 
analysis, were not used for analysis of the results. The ‘UEA set’ was composed of ten 
egalitarian items, five individualism items, six hierarchy items and seven fatalism items (28 
items in total). Some of these were designed by Dake as ‘cultural bias’ items while others 
were ‘behavioural strategy’ items, but no distinction was made between these in the analysis 
(see Section 6.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.4: Identifying cultural biases at the level of individuals 
 
65 
 
 
Cultural bias A B C 
 
Pure egalitarians 
Pure individualists 
Pure hierarchists 
Pure fatalists 
Subtotal of respondents with a single ‘pure’ cultural bias 
Mixed cultural biases 
No cultural biases 
 
15 
3 
1 
3 
22 
60 
47 
 
22 
9 
5 
5 
41 
80 
8 
 
27 
13 
11 
8 
59 
42 
28 
 
 
Notes: 
 
This table shows the number of respondents from Sample A (N=129) which fell into 
particular cultural bias categories when using criteria A, B or C. These results relate only to 
Sample A. See Table 12.4 for equivalent results from Sample B. 
 
The cultural bias scores were all centred around the mean for the whole of Sample A and 
the criteria were defined as follows: 
 
Criteria A: In order to be classified as being of cultural bias X, the respondent has to have: 
 score for X ≥  0.5 and the other three scores < 0.0 
 
 
Criteria B: In order to be classified as being of cultural bias X, the respondent had to have: 
 score for X > 0.0 and the other three scores ≤  0.0 
 
Criteria C: In order to be classified as being of cultural bias X, the respondent had to have: 
 score for X > 0.0 and the other three scores ≤  0.0 (i.e. the same as Criteria B) 
 OR 
 score for X ≥  0.5 and the other three scores < 0.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.5: Correlations between cultural biases and risk perceptions, for each of 
the five definitions of ‘risk’ 
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Table 6.5.1: Correlations between cultural biases and Riskiness 
 
 Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism Fatalism 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War  
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
 -0.15* 
 -0.20* 
 -0.19* 
 -0.20* 
  0.15* 
0.06 
   -0.25** 
-0.14 
 0.07 
 0.05 
 -0.18* 
-0.09 
-0.03 
 
 0.06 
 0.01 
 0.01 
-0.13 
 0.09 
 0.01 
 0.05 
-0.13 
  0.15* 
 0.12 
-0.12 
-0.05 
 0.08 
 
    0.23** 
     0.34*** 
 0.11 
  0.16* 
-0.03 
 0.00 
   0.21** 
 0.02 
  0.15* 
-0.08 
 0.11 
  0.16* 
0.09 
 
 0.04 
 0.12 
-0.14 
0.02 
   0.26** 
-0.05 
 0.01 
-0.13 
   0.18* 
   0.15* 
 0.00 
 0.13 
-0.06 
 
 
Table 6.5.2: Correlations between cultural biases and Fatalities 
 
 Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism Fatalism 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War  
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
 -0.17* 
0.04 
0.07 
  -0.23** 
0.05 
-0.03 
 -0.18* 
  -0.25** 
0.01 
-0.05 
-0.11 
-0.07 
    -0.28*** 
 
-0.03 
  0.17* 
  0.16* 
-0.05 
 0.06 
-0.10 
-0.11 
 -0.18* 
0.01 
0.09 
0.01 
0.14 
 -0.20* 
 
0.10 
0.08 
0.13 
  0.17* 
0.02 
0.12 
-0.01 
0.11 
0.05 
0.02 
0.10 
0.11 
  0.15* 
 
0.02 
0.13 
  0.16* 
0.09 
0.14 
-0.13 
-0.01 
-0.05 
0.01 
-0.04 
-0.04 
0.08 
-0.12 
Table 6.5.3: Correlations between cultural biases and Injuries 
 
 Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism Fatalism 
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Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War  
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
-0.09 
 -0.15* 
-0.07 
    -0.31*** 
0.05 
-0.12 
 -0.15* 
 -0.17* 
 0.08 
-0.04 
-0.14 
 0.01 
  -0.20**  
 0.04 
-0.05 
 0.05 
-0.14 
  0.17* 
-0.10 
 0.01 
-0.11 
 0.11 
 0.10 
-0.02 
  0.19* 
-0.10 
 0.05 
 0.12 
 0.07 
   0.26** 
 0.01 
 0.14 
 0.04 
 0.14 
-0.02 
 0.06 
 0.05 
 0.04 
  0.19* 
 0.02 
 0.05 
  0.17* 
 0.06 
 0.11 
 -0.16* 
 0.04 
-0.07 
 0.04 
-0.06 
-0.03 
 0.10 
  -0.25**  
 
 
Table 6.5.4: Correlations between cultural biases and Environmental Harm 
 
 Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism Fatalism 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War  
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
 0.01 
 -0.16* 
   -0.21** 
    -0.31*** 
 0.11 
-0.00 
    -0.32*** 
    -0.32*** 
-0.05 
-0.01 
 -0.16* 
-0.04 
-0.03  
 
 0.13 
 -0.16* 
-0.09 
 -0.20* 
     0.28*** 
  0.16* 
    -0.31*** 
 -0.18* 
0.02 
  0.15* 
-0.09 
    0.21** 
 0.10 
 
-0.06 
 0.00 
 0.06 
   0.23** 
 0.04 
 0.13 
  0.18* 
    0.33*** 
 0.09 
 0.04 
 0.14 
  0.18* 
 0.14 
 
 0.14 
 0.03 
 0.03 
-0.02 
  0.18* 
 0.14 
-0.04 
-0.01 
 0.13 
   0.21** 
 0.03 
 0.14 
  0.19* 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.5.5: Correlations between cultural biases and Unacceptability 
 
 Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism Fatalism 
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Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War  
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
-0.12 
-0.12 
-0.19* 
-0.29*** 
0.13 
0.06 
-0.23** 
-0.16* 
-0.06 
0.08 
-0.08 
0.02 
-0.11 
0.03 
-0.09 
-0.10 
-0.20* 
0.07 
0.04 
-0.19* 
-0.07 
-0.04 
0.03 
-0.11 
0.03 
0.10  
0.24** 
0.23** 
0.21** 
0.31*** 
0.11 
0.20* 
0.17* 
0.07 
0.26** 
0.16* 
0.13 
0.07 
0.24**     
0.09 
-0.02 
-0.01 
0.04 
0.04 
-0.05 
-0.09 
-0.11 
0.01 
0.00 
-0.13 
-0.10 
-0.08 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 
Tables 6.5.1 to 6.5.5 list correlations between: 
1. the risk perception scores (with risk defined, respectively, as Riskiness, Fatalities, 
Injuries, Environmental Harm and Unacceptability) given to each risk issue by 
each of the respondents in Sample A; and 
2. the cultural bias scores obtained by those same respondents. 
 
For example, the first cell of Table 6.5.1 shows the correlation between the scores given by 
each respondent to the Riskiness of sunbathing and the individualism score of those same 
respondents. In this particular case, the correlation (-0.15) was significant (p < 0.05), and 
negative, indicating that respondents who had a high score for individualism tend to give a 
low rating for the Riskiness of sunbathing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.6: Relationship between cultural biases and risk perceptions, summarised 
across all five definitions of ‘risk’ 
 
 Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism Fatalism 
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Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War  
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 
This table indicates the highest correlation obtained from Sample A between cultural biases 
and risk perceptions using any one of the definitions of ‘risk’ (Riskiness, Fatalities, Injuries, 
Environmental Harm or Unacceptability); i.e. it shows the strongest correlation listed in 
Tables 6.6.1 to 6.6.5. This Table should be compared to Table 1.1, which listed the 
relationships between cultural biases and risk perceptions predicted before the data was 
collected.  
 
Asterisks indicate a positive relationship between the risk issue and risk perception. For 
example, there was a statistically significant correlation between high levels of concern 
about genetic engineering and an egalitarian worldview. Squares indicate a negative 
relationship between the risk issue and risk perception. For example, there was a statistically 
significant correlation between low levels of concern about genetic engineering and an 
individualist worldview. The number of symbols indicates the level of significance of the 
correlation: one symbol means p < 0.05; two symbols means p < 0.01; and three symbols 
means p < 0.001.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.7: Correlations between cultural biases and trust in institutions 
 
 Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism Fatalism 
 
Government 
 
    0.26** 
 
    0.22** 
 
-0.08 
 
 -0.19* 
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Companies 
Environmental orgs. 
Media 
Scientists 
Trade Unions 
Religious orgs. 
Friends 
Family 
Doctors 
    0.27** 
-0.05 
-0.12 
 0.07 
    -0.30*** 
-0.02 
-0.03 
 0.13 
 0.11 
     0.39*** 
-0.05 
 0.01 
  0.15* 
   -0.28*** 
   0.22** 
 0.13 
   0.20** 
   0.23**  
 -0.15* 
0.05 
  0.19* 
0.11 
    0.29*** 
   0.21** 
0.08 
0.12 
0.02   
0.03 
 -0.15* 
0.13 
-0.06 
-0.04 
-0.10 
  0.15* 
  0.19* 
    0.26** 
 
 
Notes: 
 
This table lists correlations between the cultural bias scores obtained by each of the 
respondents in Sample A and the trust score those same respondents gave to specific 
institutions. The question asked was “who would you trust to tell you the truth about risks?”, 
and the respondents were given a 4-point scale where 1 corresponded to “never trust”, 2 to 
“sometimes trust”, 3 to “often trust” and 4 to “always trust”. Thus positive correlations in this 
table refer to high levels of trust, and negative correlations to low levels of trust.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
71 
 
 
Table 6.8: Correlations between cultural biases and environmentalism (and myths of Nature) 
 
 Statement Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism Fatalism 
 
ENV1 
 
ENV2 
 
ENV3 
 
ENV4 
 
ENV5 
ENV6 
ENV7 
ENV8 
ENV9 
 
ENV10 
ENV11 
 
The environment is very adaptable and will recover from any harm caused 
by people. [Nature benign] 
With expert management, we can prevent environmental disasters. 
[Nature perverse/tolerant] 
The environment is very fragile and the slightest human interference will 
cause a major disaster. [Nature ephemeral] 
No matter what we do, the environment will change in unpredictable ways 
both for the better and the worse. [Nature capricious] 
Large businesses have too much influence on ordinary people. 
Big corporations are responsible for most of the evil in the world. 
Industry left to itself will harm the environment. 
The misuse of technology is a serious problem in the world today. 
Decisions in business and government should rely more heavily on 
participation by members of the public. 
There are too many laws controlling technology. 
Concern about the environment restricts industry too much. 
 
   0.23** 
 
    0.28*** 
 
-0.08 
 
 0.13 
 
-0.13 
-0.04 
-0.11 
  -0.26** 
  -0.23** 
 
  0.20* 
    0.41*** 
 
  0.11 
 
  0.16* 
 
 0.07 
 
 0.12 
 
-0.08 
 0.03 
  -0.22** 
-0.06 
-0.03 
 
    0.32*** 
    0.46*** 
 
  -0.17* 
 
 0.05 
 
    0.27*** 
 
-0.05 
 
    0.43*** 
    0.33*** 
    0.29*** 
    0.37*** 
    0.45*** 
 
0.00 
 -0.26** 
 
 0.07 
 
-0.07 
 
   0.20** 
 
  0.18* 
 
 0.14 
    0.45*** 
 0.11 
 0.12 
  0.19* 
 
   0.24** 
   0.22** 
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Table 6.9: Relationship between cultural biases and group membership 
 
 
No. of 
members 
Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism Fatalism 
 
Conservation orgs. 
Environmental orgs. 
Trade unions 
Sports clubs 
Religious orgs. 
Political parties 
 
40 
24 
36 
46 
21 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 
The first column in this table lists the number of respondents in Sample A (N=131) who 
stated that they were members of each specific type of group. Columns 3 to 6 indicate the 
relationship between each cultural bias and membership of groups, as revealed by analysis 
of variance. Asterisks indicate that the cultural bias was associated with membership of the 
specific type of group; and squares indicate that the cultural bias was associated with non-
membership of that type of group. The number of symbols indicates the level of significance 
of the correlation: one symbol means p < 0.05; two symbols means p < 0.01; and three 
symbols means p < 0.001. 
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Table 7.1: Correlations between cultural biases and scores given to the nine risk 
characteristics, aggregated for all thirteen risk issues 
 
 Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism Fatalism 
 
Delayed effects 
Involuntariness 
Unfairness 
Harm to future generations 
Catastrophic potential 
Dread 
Severity 
Lack of knowledge to exposed 
Lack of knowledge to science 
 
-0.02 
-0.08 
-0.11 
-0.12 
-0.04 
-0.01 
 0.01 
-0.13 
-0.09 
 
 0.02 
-0.11 
-0.07 
 0.00 
 0.02 
-0.02 
 0.01 
-0.11 
-0.07  
 
 0.10 
   0.15* 
-0.04 
    0.25** 
    0.24** 
 0.13 
    0.25** 
-0.01 
-0.01  
 
-0.01 
 0.06 
 0.02 
  0.17* 
  0.17* 
   0.24** 
 0.08 
 0.08 
  0.16* 
 
 
Notes: 
 
This table lists correlations between: 
1. the scores obtained by each respondent for each of the four cultural biases in 
turn; and 
2. the mean ratings (for the thirteen risk-issues) given by those same respondents 
to each of the psychometric risk characteristics in turn. 
 
For example, the first cell shows the correlation between the individualism scores obtained 
by each of the 131 respondents and the mean of the thirteen separate scores those same 
respondents gave to ‘delayed effects’ for each of the thirteen risk issues. In this particular 
case, the correlation in very low (0.02) and is not significant at the 95% significance level. 
The highest correlation in the table is between egalitarianism and ‘harm to future 
generations’ (0.25), and this is significant at the 97.5% level. This indicates that respondents 
who had high egalitarian scores tended to feel that all thirteen risk issues caused harm to 
future generations.  
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Table 7.2: Correlations between cultural biases and scores given to the nine risk 
characteristics for each risk issue 
 
 
Table 7.2.1: Harm to future generations 
 
 Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism Fatalism 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War  
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
-0.11 
-0.16* 
-0.18* 
-0.13 
0.07 
0.04 
-0.24** 
-0.21** 
-0.04 
0.08 
-0.07 
0.09 
-0.19* 
 
0.08 
-0.05 
-0.15* 
-0.15* 
0.22** 
-0.05 
-0.23** 
-0.08 
-0.01 
0.12 
-0.04 
0.18* 
-0.06  
 
  0.15* 
 0.07 
-0.01 
   0.24** 
 0.06 
 0.07 
   0.19* 
     0.29*** 
 0.03 
  0.16* 
  0.19* 
 0.17* 
 0.10  
 
  0.15* 
 0.02 
-0.11 
0.00 
    0.29*** 
    0.27*** 
-0.11 
 0.12 
 0.08 
 0.09 
 0.05 
  0.18* 
-0.07 
 
 
Table 7.2.2: Delayed effects 
 
 Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism Fatalism 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War  
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
-0.06 
-0.12 
-0.13 
  -0.22** 
 0.13 
  0.16* 
-0.07 
-0.06 
-0.06 
 0.14 
 0.01 
 0.05 
-0.03 
 
 -0.10 
   -0.19* 
    -0.21** 
  -0.18* 
   0.17* 
    0.24** 
 -0.16* 
 0.04 
-0.12 
 0.12 
  0.17* 
    0.22** 
-0.09  
 
-0.03 
 0.06 
 0.05 
   0.21** 
-0.03 
 0.08 
-0.02 
  0.20* 
  0.19* 
-0.04 
-0.02 
 0.00 
 0.03  
 
-0.11 
-0.08 
   -0.22** 
-0.04 
0.14 
  0.18* 
   -0.23** 
 0.08 
-0.02 
 0.05 
 0.08 
 0.10 
-0.12 
Table 7.2.3: Catastrophic potential 
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 Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism Fatalism 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War  
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
-0.08 
-0.07 
-0.11 
-0.03 
 0.13 
-0.02 
-0.13 
-0.02 
 0.00 
-0.04 
-0.02 
    0.21** 
 0.02 
 
 -0.17* 
-0.13 
-0.10 
-0.04 
    0.22** 
 0.01 
 -0.17* 
 0.14 
 0.12 
 0.03 
 0.05 
    0.27** 
 0.05  
 
0.02 
0.04 
   0.24** 
   0.27** 
0.06 
0.08 
  0.16* 
  0.17* 
0.02 
0.07 
  0.18* 
0.03 
0.04  
 
 0.11 
-0.01 
 0.06 
-0.03 
    0.34*** 
   0.16* 
 0.05 
 0.11 
 0.03 
 0.09 
-0.08 
 0.05 
-0.01 
 
 
 
Table 7.2.4: Dread 
 
 Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism Fatalism 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War  
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
 0.01 
-0.09 
-0.08 
-0.03 
 0.13 
 0.04 
   -0.26** 
-0.06 
 0.03 
 0.09 
-0.03 
 0.09 
-0.08 
 
 0.08 
  -0.16* 
-0.07 
-0.02 
0.14 
-0.01 
 -0.17* 
-0.10 
 0.00 
 0.04 
-0.04 
-0.02 
-0.05  
 
 0.06 
 0.09 
 0.14 
     0.30*** 
 0.00 
-0.04 
   0.22** 
 0.01 
 0.10 
0.02 
0.09 
0.00 
0.09 
 
    0.21** 
   0.18* 
-0.02 
    0.28*** 
    0.32*** 
 0.09 
 0.07 
 0.10 
 0.06 
    0.21** 
   0.15* 
 0.14 
-0.06 
 
 
 
Table 7.2.5: Severity 
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 Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism Fatalism 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War  
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
-0.09 
-0.08 
 0.07 
-0.10 
 0.14 
 0.13 
-0.14 
-0.00 
-0.07 
 0.08 
 0.11 
 0.13 
-0.13 
 
-0.02 
-0.07 
 0.07 
-0.07 
-0.04 
 0.02 
-0.18* 
-0.02 
-0.03 
 0.02 
  0.15* 
  0.20* 
-0.05  
 
    0.25** 
0.13 
   0.17* 
   0.17* 
 0.08 
 0.07 
 0.11 
 0.13 
 0.14 
   0.21** 
0.10 
  0.19* 
0.05 
 
 0.10 
  0.18* 
 0.10 
 0.11 
 0.07 
-0.13 
 0.02 
 0.06 
 0.01 
 0.04 
  0.19* 
0.09 
-0.16* 
 
 
 
Table 7.2.6: Involuntariness 
 
 Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism Fatalism 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War  
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
-0.06 
-0.12 
-0.08 
-0.06 
 0.01 
 0.13 
-0.11 
-0.06 
-0.12 
 0.10 
 0.03 
 0.05 
 0.06 
 
-0.10 
   -0.24** 
  -0.17* 
-0.13 
 0.02 
 0.10 
-0.11 
-0.04 
-0.04 
 0.02 
 0.09 
 0.06 
 0.00  
 
 0.00 
-0.01 
 0.11 
     0.29*** 
  0.15* 
 0.07 
 0.09 
 0.03 
-0.03 
 0.03 
 0.10 
 0.08 
 -0.16*  
 
   0.15* 
   -0.22** 
-0.02 
-0.09 
-0.01 
   0.20* 
-0.08 
   0.19* 
 0.07 
 0.11 
-0.07 
-0.09 
-0.08 
 
 
 
Table 7.2.7: Unfairness 
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 Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism Fatalism 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War  
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
  0.16* 
-0.12 
-0.04 
-0.12 
-0.08 
 0.01 
-0.03 
-0.00 
-0.05 
 -0.15* 
-0.13 
-0.07 
 0.07 
 
    0.23** 
 0.01 
-0.05 
-0.12 
    -0.30*** 
 0.00 
-0.04 
 0.03 
 0.06 
-0.09 
    -0.30*** 
-0.13 
 0.06 
 
     -0.29*** 
-0.03 
-0.01 
-0.01 
-0.04 
-0.09 
-0.01 
 0.08 
-0.03 
 0.06 
 0.07 
 0.04 
-0.11 
 
  0.16* 
-0.05 
 0.03 
-0.04 
-0.18* 
 0.10 
 0.04 
 0.06 
 0.02 
-0.03 
-0.08 
-0.08 
 0.07 
 
 
 
Table 7.2.8: Lack of knowledge to science 
 
 Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism Fatalism 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War  
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
 0.12 
-0.02 
  -0.19* 
-0.13 
-0.00 
 0.12 
-0.04 
-0.02 
-0.04 
-0.15* 
-0.12 
-0.12 
 0.02 
 
 0.01 
 0.02 
   -0.24** 
  -0.15* 
-0.04 
 0.08 
-0.05 
 0.00 
-0.02 
-0.03 
-0.01 
-0.04 
-0.01  
 
 -0.08 
-0.04 
 0.04 
 0.12 
-0.03 
-0.04 
-0.04 
-0.11 
 0.00 
 0.04 
-0.02 
 0.01 
-0.04 
 
  0.16* 
 0.06 
-0.02 
0.00 
   0.21** 
    0.27*** 
-0.00 
    0.26** 
 0.04 
-0.09 
 0.08 
 0.10 
-0.08 
 
 
 
Table 7.2.9: Lack of knowledge to those exposed 
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 Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism Fatalism 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War  
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
-0.10 
-0.02 
-0.07 
-0.18* 
-0.11 
-0.13 
0.05 
-0.14 
-0.09 
0.01 
0.01 
-0.04 
0.02 
 
-0.19* 
-0.04 
-0.12 
-0.07 
-0.07 
-0.14 
0.14 
-0.16* 
-0.18* 
-0.06 
0.11 
0.09 
-0.11  
 
-0.02 
-0.01 
-0.06 
 0.06 
 0.05 
-0.06 
 -0.15* 
 0.00 
-0.06 
 0.08 
-0.03 
 0.08 
 0.01  
 
-0.09 
-0.03 
 0.09 
-0.05 
 0.12 
-0.02 
 0.03 
 0.12 
-0.01 
-0.01 
    0.21** 
  0.16* 
-0.01 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 
Tables 7.2.1 to 7.2.9 list correlations between: 
1. the scores given by each of the respondents for each risk issue on each risk 
characteristic; and 
2. the cultural bias scores obtained by those same respondents. 
 
For example, the first row of Table 7.2.1 lists the correlation between the 131 scores given 
by each of the respondents to the harm to future generations caused by sunbathing with the 
cultural bias scores of those same respondents. In this particular case, the correlation is low 
for individualism and hierarchy, but higher (and significant at the 95% confidence level) for 
egalitarianism and fatalism. This indicates that the egalitarian and fatalist worldviews were 
associated with feeling that future generations will be harmed by sunbathing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.3: Correlations between cultural biases and the perceived importance of 
the nine risk characteristics 
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 Individualism Hierarchy Egalitarianism Fatalism 
 
Involuntariness  
Delayed effects 
Severity 
Dread 
Catastrophic potential 
Harm to future generations 
Lack of knowledge to exposed 
Lack of knowledge to science 
Unfairness 
 
   0.16* 
 0.01 
-0.06 
 0.10 
-0.05 
-0.10 
 0.08 
 0.07 
-0.03 
 
   0.19* 
-0.05 
-0.05 
   0.16* 
-0.00 
   0.15* 
0.11 
  0.15* 
  0.20*   
 
 0.06 
0.05 
 0.11 
 0.11 
 0.11 
   0.20** 
-0.05 
 0.04 
 0.13   
 
 0.06 
  0.19* 
-0.04 
    0.34*** 
 0.00 
-0.11 
 0.00 
 0.01 
 0.05 
 
 
Notes: 
 
This table lists correlations between the cultural bias scores obtained by each of the 
respondents and their answer to the question ”when you think about risks in general, do you 
think [risk characteristic X] is important?”. For example, the highest correlation obtained was 
between fatalism and dread (0.34), and this was significant at the 99% level, indicating that 
respondents who had a high score for fatalism tended to feel that dread was an important 
factor when making decisions about risk.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.1: Correlations between ‘general risk perceptions’ and age, and income 
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Definition of ‘risk’ Age Income 
 
Riskiness 
Fatalities 
Injuries 
Environmental Harm 
Unacceptability 
 
-0.03 
  -0.24** 
    -0.32*** 
-0.17* 
0.12 
 
 -0.18* 
 -0.19* 
-0.10 
   -0.23** 
 -0.17* 
 
 
Notes: 
 
This table lists correlations between: 
1. the mean scores (for the thirteen risk-issues) given by each of the respondents 
for the risk associated with the thirteen issues (with ‘risk’ defined in five different 
ways as Riskiness, Fatalities, Injuries, Environmental Harm and Unacceptability); 
and 
2. the age and household income of those same respondents.  
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Table 8.2: Percentage variance in individual risk perceptions explained by socio-demographic variables 
 
Risk issues Riskiness Fatalities Injuries Environmental 
Harm 
Unacceptability 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War 
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
5 
4 
0 
4 
16*** 
7* 
3 
3 
12** 
5 
0 
6* 
8* 
 
3 
11** 
12** 
10** 
21*** 
9 
0 
11** 
0 
10** 
5 
13** 
20*** 
 
8* 
3 
12** 
15** 
28*** 
9* 
0 
10** 
1 
11** 
6 
18*** 
20*** 
 
7* 
8* 
0 
12** 
16*** 
8* 
11** 
10** 
1 
4 
6* 
16*** 
11** 
 
3 
0 
1 
6* 
12** 
19*** 
3 
0 
0 
13** 
5 
5 
9** 
 
 
Notes: 
 
This table lists the adjusted multiple R2  values obtained from regression analysis of risk perceptions for each of the thirteen risk issues. The 
independent variables were: sex (categorical); age (continuous); class (categorical: classes 1 and 2 versus 3, 4, 5 and 6); level of education 
(categorical: university degree versus no university degree); and household income (continuous).  
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Table 9.1: Correlations between risk characteristics and age, and income 
 
 
 Age Income 
 
Involuntariness  
Delayed effects 
Severity 
Dread 
Catastrophic potential 
Harm to future generations 
Lack of knowledge to exposed 
Lack of knowledge to science 
Unfairness 
 
-0.06 
-0.05 
 -0.17* 
-0.04 
 -0.19* 
-0.09 
-0.14 
 0.00 
-0.03   
 
 0.04 
 -0.15* 
 0.00 
   -0.26** 
-0.03 
 -0.17* 
0.09 
-0.11 
  0.18* 
 
 
Notes: 
 
This table lists correlations between: 
1. the mean scores (for the thirteen risk issues) given by each of the respondents to 
the nine risk characteristics; and 
2. the age and household income of those same respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10.1: Correlations between cultural biases and age, and income 
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Cultural bias Age Income 
 
Individualism 
Hierarchy 
Egalitarianism 
Fatalism 
 
   0.23** 
    0.37*** 
0.08 
0.13 
 
-0.09 
-0.19* 
-0.06 
    -0.36*** 
 
 
Notes: 
 
This table lists correlations between: 
1. the cultural bias scores obtained by each respondent; and 
2. the age and household income of those same respondents.  
 
 
 
 
Table 10.2: Percentage of variance in cultural biases explained by socio-
demographic variables 
 
 
Cultural biases R2 adjusted 
 
Individualism 
Hierarchy 
Egalitarianism 
Fatalism 
 
16*** 
16*** 
7* 
23*** 
 
 
Notes: 
 
This table lists the adjusted multiple R2 values and p-values obtained from regression 
analyses for each set of cultural bias scores. The independent variables were: sex 
(categorical); age (continuous); class (categorical: classes 1 and 2 versus 3, 4, 5 and 6); 
education (categorical: university degree versus no university degree); and household 
income (continuous).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11.1: Percentage of variance in individual risk perceptions explained by the 
‘psychometric paradigm’ and by cultural theory 
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Risk issues Psychometric 
paradigm 
Cultural theory Socio-demographic 
variables 
 
Food colourings 
Nuclear power 
Genetic engineering 
Mugging 
Microwave ovens 
Car driving 
Sunbathing 
Terrorism 
Ozone depletion 
Home accidents 
AIDS 
Alcoholic drinks  
War 
 
41*** 
34*** 
32*** 
31*** 
27*** 
26*** 
25*** 
22*** 
21*** 
17*** 
15** 
14** 
6 
 
12** 
2 
3 
5* 
5* 
0 
5* 
2 
9** 
0 
1 
0 
1 
 
4 
4 
0 
16*** 
12** 
3 
5 
6* 
3 
7* 
5 
8* 
0 
 
 
Notes: 
 
This table lists the adjusted multiple R2 values obtained from regression analyses of scores 
for risk perception (defined as Riskiness) using: 
 
Column 2: all nine risk characteristics as independent variables (involuntariness, delayed 
effects, severity, dread, catastrophic potential, harm to future generations, 
lack of knowledge to those exposed, lack of knowledge to scientists, and 
unfairness). (This is the same data as that presented in Table 5.6). 
 
Column 3: all four cultural biases together (individualism, hierarchy, egalitarianism and 
fatalism). 
 
Column 4: all socio-demographic variables together (sex, age, class, education and 
income). (This is the same data as that presented in Table 8.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12.1: Mean cultural bias scores for the Greenhouse, Scouts, and Chamber of 
Commerce sub-samples of Sample B 
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Cultural bias 
Sample A Greenhouse Scouts Chamber of 
Commerce 
 
Egalitarianism 
Individualism 
Hierarchy 
Fatalism 
 
3.70 
3.37 
3.79 
2.28 
 
   4.54*** 
   1.96*** 
   2.89*** 
2.14 
 
3.47 
3.49 
 4.19* 
2.50 
 
3.54 
3.29 
3.54 
2.26 
 
 
Notes: 
 
Asterisks indicate statistically significant differences with the mean cultural bias scores for 
Sample A, as determined by Tukey’s pairwise comparisons (* = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, and 
*** = p < 0.001). For example, the mean egalitarian, individualist and hierarchy scores for the 
Greenhouse were all significantly different from those in Sample A, with p < 0.001 in all three 
cases.  
 
 
Table 12.2: Statistical significance of differences between mean cultural bias scores 
for the Greenhouse, Scouts and Chamber of Commerce sub-samples of 
Sample B 
 
Cultural bias 
Greenhouse vs 
Scouts 
Greenhouse vs 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
Scouts vs 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
 
Egalitarianism 
Individualism 
Hierarchy 
Fatalism 
 
   
   
   
- 
 
   
  
   
- 
 
- 
  
-  
- 
 
 
Notes: 
 
Asterisks indicate statistically significant differences between mean cultural bias scores for 
each pair of sub-samples of Sample B, as determined by Tukey’s pairwise comparisons (* = 
p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, and *** = p < 0.001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12.3: Percentage of respondents from each sub-sample of Sample B who fell 
into particular cultural bias categories 
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Cultural bias 
Sample A  
(N = 129) 
Greenhouse 
(N = 28) 
Scouts 
(N = 23) 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
(N = 19) 
 
Pure egalitarians 
Pure individualists 
Pure hierarchists 
Pure fatalists 
 
Subtotal of respondents with 
a single ‘pure’ cultural bias 
 
Mixed cultural biases 
No cultural bias 
Total 
 
21 
10 
9 
6 
 
46 
 
 
33 
22 
101 
 
85 
0 
0 
0 
 
85 
 
 
11 
4 
100 
 
4 
9 
22 
9 
 
43 
 
 
57 
0 
101 
 
16 
5 
5 
21 
 
47 
 
 
47 
5 
99 
 
 
Notes: 
 
Respondents were allocated into cultural bias categories according to Criteria C, as 
described in Section 6.1. 
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Table 12.4: Mean risk perception scores for each risk issue from Sample B 
 
 
Table 12.4.1: Mean risk perception scores for each risk issue from the Greenhouse sub-sample 
 
Risk issues Riskiness Fatalities Injuries Environmental 
Harm 
Unacceptability 
 
Nuclear power 
War 
Car driving 
Ozone depletion 
Genetic engineering 
AIDS 
Sunbathing 
Alcoholic drinks 
Terrorism 
Food colourings 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Microwave ovens 
 
4.7 
4.5 
4.4 
4.3 
4.2 
3.6 
3.4 
3.3 
3.3 
2.9 
2.8 
2.7 
2.0 
 
2.7 
4.6 
4.2 
2.4 
1.4 
3.4 
2.3 
3.4 
2.5 
1.4 
2.3 
2.9 
1.3 
 
3.4 
4.7 
4.4 
3.1 
1.9 
3.6 
3.1 
3.9 
2.8 
2.0 
2.9 
3.5 
1.4 
 
4.0 
4.5 
4.4 
3.5 
4.0 
1.8 
2.0 
2.1 
2.2 
1.9 
1.3 
2.0 
1.5 
 
4.8 
4.9 
4.5 
4.7 
4.1 
4.1 
3.4 
3.3 
4.3 
3.4 
3.8 
2.7 
2.2 
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Table 12.4.2: Mean risk perception scores for each risk issue from the Scouts sub-sample 
 
Risk issues Riskiness Fatalities Injuries Environmental 
Harm 
Unacceptability 
Sunbathing 
 
Nuclear power 
Ozone depletion 
Mugging 
Genetic engineering  
AIDS 
Home accidents 
Car driving 
War 
Alcoholic drinks 
Terrorism 
Food colourings 
Microwave ovens 
 
4.0 
4.0 
4.0 
3.8 
3.7 
3.7 
3.5 
3.5 
3.5 
3.4 
3.3 
3.0 
2.6 
 
2.3 
2.7 
2.3 
3.0 
2.1 
3.0 
3.4 
4.2 
3.6 
3.3 
3.0 
1.5 
1.5 
 
3.1 
2.9 
2.6 
3.5 
2.3 
3.2 
3.8 
4.2 
3.7 
3.6 
3.2 
2.1 
1.7 
 
1.9 
3.4 
3.2 
1.7 
2.8 
1.9 
1.9 
3.1 
3.5 
2.6 
2.8 
1.7 
1.6 
 
2.9 
3.6 
4.0 
3.8 
3.0 
4.0 
3.3 
3.4 
4.5 
3.6 
4.4 
2.5 
2.2 
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Table 12.4.3: Mean risk perception scores for each risk issue from the Chamber of Commerce sub-sample 
 
Risk issues Riskiness Fatalities Injuries Environmental 
Harm 
Unacceptability 
 
Nuclear power 
Genetic engineering 
Ozone depletion 
Sunbathing 
Car driving 
War 
AIDS 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Terrorism 
Food colourings 
Alcoholic drinks 
Microwave ovens 
 
4.2 
4.2 
4.0 
3.8 
3.8 
3.4 
3.3 
3.3 
3.2 
3.1 
2.8 
2.8 
2.1 
 
2.4 
1.6 
1.7 
1.9 
3.6 
3.9 
2.8 
2.7 
3.0 
2.4 
1.2 
3.0 
1.2 
 
2.7 
1.8 
2.2 
2.8 
3.7 
3.9 
3.1 
3.2 
3.3 
2.6 
2.0 
3.3 
1.4 
 
3.6 
3.0 
3.5 
1.9 
3.7 
3.7 
2.0 
1.7 
1.5 
2.4 
1.7 
2.1 
1.4 
 
4.1 
3.8 
4.2 
3.1 
3.6 
4.3 
3.4 
3.5 
2.7 
3.8 
3.0 
2.9 
1.8 
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Table 12.5: Statistical significance of differences in Unacceptability ratings between 
the Greenhouse, Scouts and Chamber of Commerce sub-sample of 
Sample B 
 
 
 
Greenhouse vs 
Scouts 
Greenhouse vs 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
Scouts vs 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War 
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 
Statistically significant differences were determined by Tukey’s pairwise comparisons. The 
number of asterisks indicate the level of significance of the differences.  
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Table 12.6: Statistical significance on differences in risk perception between 
Greenhouse, Scouts and Chamber of Commerce sub-samples of 
Sample B, summarised across all five definitions of risk 
 
 
Greenhouse vs 
Scouts 
Greenhouse vs 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
Scouts vs 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
 
Sunbathing 
Food colourings 
Genetic engineering 
Nuclear power 
Mugging 
Home accidents 
Ozone depletion 
Car driving 
Microwave ovens 
AIDS 
War 
Terrorism 
Alcoholic drinks 
 
 
  
  
   
 
 
   
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 
Asterisks indicate statistically significant differences in risk perception scores obtained for 
each pair of sub-samples of Sample B, as determined by Tukey’s pairwise comparisons (* = 
p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, and *** = p < 0.001). The strongest difference revealed when any 
one of the five definitions of risk was used is shown here (i.e. either Riskiness, Fatalities, 
Injuries, Environmental Harm or Unacceptability).  
 
For sunbathing, genetic engineering, nuclear power, ozone depletion, car driving and war, 
the risk ratings were higher for the Greenhouse than for the Scots. For food colourings, 
mugging and home accidents, the risk ratings were higher for the Scouts than for the 
Greenhouse. In all cases where statistical significance was observed, the risk ratings for the 
Greenhouse were higher than those for the Chamber of Commerce. For genetic 
engineering, the Chamber of Commerce risk ratings were higher than those for the Scouts.  
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Table 12.7: Trust in institutions for each of the sub-samples of Sample B 
 
 Sample A Sample B Greenhouse Scouts Chamber of 
Commerce 
 
The Government 
Companies 
The Media 
Religious orgs. 
Trade unions 
Scientists 
Doctor 
Environmental orgs. 
Friends 
Family 
 
8 
13 
16 
22 
28 
60 
76 
79 
80 
87 
 
3 
4 
13 
22 
26 
33 
70 
72 
75 
84 
 
0 
0* 
7 
7 
37 
11*** 
52* 
81 
78 
74 
 
4 
9 
26 
39 
22 
57 
91 
65 
74 
96 
 
5 
5 
5 
21 
16 
37 
68 
68 
74 
84 
 
 
Notes: 
 
This table lists the percentages of respondents who said they would “often” or “always” trust 
each institution to “tell them the truth about risks”. Asterisks indicate significant differences 
between Sample B and Sample A, as determined by Tukey’s pairwise comparisons (e.g. 
respondents from the Greenhouse sub-sample showed significantly less trust in scientists 
than those from Sample A). 
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Table 12.8: Statistical significance of differences in trust ratings between the 
Greenhouse, Scouts and Chamber of Commerce sub-samples of 
Sample B 
 
 
Greenhouse vs 
Scouts 
Greenhouse vs 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
Scouts vs 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
 
The Government 
Companies 
The Media 
Religious orgs. 
Trade unions 
Scientists 
Doctor 
Environmental orgs. 
Friends 
Family 
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 
Statistically significant differences were determined by Tukey’s pairwise comparisons. In all 
cases where statistically significant differences were found, the Scouts sub-sample had 
higher levels of trust than the Greenhouse sub-sample.  
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High Grid 
High Group 
Low Grid 
Low Group 
FATALISM HIERARCHY 
INDIVIDUALISM EGALITARIANISM 
Figure 1.1: Grid-group taxonomy of cultural theory17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Adapted from Thompson et al. (1990). 
95 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Factor space for Factors 1 and 2 
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Figure 5.2: Hierarchical cluster analysis of the nine risk characteristics 
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Figure 5.3: Graphical illustration of the difference between correlations using mean 
risk perception scores and those using individual scores 
 
 
Figure 5.3.1: Scatter plot of mean scores 
 
This graph illustrates the correlation between the mean scores (for all 131 respondents) 
obtained for the Riskiness of each risk0issue with the mean scores (for all 131 respondents) 
obtained for the delayed effects caused by those 13 risk-issues. Each dot represents one of 
the thirteen issues. In this particular case, the correlation is high (0.74), indicating that risk 
issues which were, on average, thought to have many delayed effects were perceived as 
more ‘risky’ than those which were thought to have fewer delayed effects.  
 
Correlations between risk perceptions (defined in five different ways) and the other eight risk 
characteristics are listed in Table 5.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3.2: Scatter plot of individual scores 
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This graph illustrates the correlation between individuals’ score for the Riskiness of 
sunbathing and their scores for ‘delayed effects’ associated with sunbathing. The size of the 
dots represents the number of respondents who gave that particular score. In this particular 
case, the correlation was 0.30 and was highly significant (p < 0.001), indicating that when an 
individual felt that sunbathing caused many delayed effects, they also tended to feel that it 
was highly risky. 
 
Correlations between individual scores for risk perceptions (defined as Riskiness) and 
scores for the other eight risk characteristics, for each risk-issue, are listed in Table 5.6. 
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Figure 6.1: Hierarchical cluster of all the cultural bias items in the questionnaire18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Excluding the ‘behavioural strategy’ items, and with none f the items reversed-scored. 
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Figure 6.2: Hierarchical cluster of the ‘UEA set’ of cultural bias items 
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Figure 6.3: Percentage of respondents in Sample A who said they would “often” or “always” trusts institution X to “tell them the 
truth about risks” 
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